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Den omfattende litteraturen om toppinntekter fokuserer på hvor stor andel av totalinntekten i 
samfunnet som går til de med høyest inntekt. Studier av toppinntektsandeler er viktige for å forstå 
konsentrasjon av økonomisk makt, men gir begrenset informasjon om inntektsulikhet for hele 
befolkningen. Denne artikkelen foreslår en ikke-parametrisk metode for å estimere mål for ulikhet i 
inntektsfordelingen basert på tabelldata fra ulike historiske statistiske kilder.  
 
Vi anvender den foreslåtte metoden på norske data, og finner at inntektsulikheten i Norge var svært 
høy fra slutten av 1800-tallet fram mot utbruddet av annen verdenskrig. I I løpet av okkupasjonen og 
den den første etterkrigstiden falt ulikheten raskt fram mot 1953. Det nye lave nivået på 
inntektsulikheten varte fram til slutten av 1970-tallet, mens ulikheten har økt jevnt og trutt fra rundt 
1980 og fram til dag.. Resultatene fra denne studien viser at endringer i inntektsulikheten i stor grad 
har vært et resultat av endringer i fordelingen av inntekt blant den rikeste halvparten og i endringer i 




1. Introduction: Inequality in the long-run 
The extensive country-specific top income studies initiated by Piketty (2001) and provided by 
Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010) gave rise to a broad public debate on the rising income inequality 
in OECD countries, although the results of these studies dealt exclusively with the evolution of top 
income shares.  Indeed, most of the discussion on long-run income inequality concerns the increasing 
share of total income received by the top 1 and top 10 per cent of income recipients. This is a 
legitimate and important concern, as high top income shares reflect the fact that a disproportionate 
fraction of total economic resources is being controlled by a small minority of the population.  
However, an exclusive focus on the concentration of the top 1 and 10 per cent ignores the distribution 
of income among the remaining 99 and 90 per cent of the population and can contribute to 
misinterpretation of the long-run evolution in overall income inequality. The debate between Autor 
(2014) and Piketty and Saez (2014) on the driving forces behind the steep rise in income inequality in 
the US in recent decades underlines the importance of accounting for the rise in income inequality 
among “the other 99 per cent”.  
 
The main objective of this paper is to propose a recipe for how the inequality of the income 
distribution as a whole can be estimated on the basis of different sources of tabular data from historical 
statistical income publications, which are available in many countries. This is possible without making 
assumptions about the distribution of incomes within wage groups (as in the "social tables" approach, 
e.g. Lindert and Williamson, 2016 for the United States) or relying exclusively on annual tabulations 
covering the majority of the population as is the case for Denmark (Atkinson and Søgaard, 2016). 
Complete detailed tabulations, like those for Denmark, appear to be an exception.  Most developed 
countries have, however, collected income taxes on a regular basis and as a minimum published 
various aggregated quantities in some periods and detailed tabulations in other periods. This paper 
demonstrates that such combined data provide sufficient information to obtain reliable estimates of the 
the Gini coefficient across time. The presence of various aggregated quantities of individual incomes 
for each year, allows estimation of points on the Lorenz curve and proves to provide a useful basis for 
estimating the Gini coefficient and any other rank-dependent measure of inequality. Thus, in constrast 
to most previous studies, we do not limit the description of the evolution of long-run income 
inequality to years where complete tabulations are available, nor do we rely on interpolation of 
observations between years. Indeed, the paper demonstrates that much can be learned even in cases 
where detailed annual tabulations do not exist. By combining data from different historical statistical 
sources, a more complete picture of the distribution can be attained than that obtained from central 
government tax records alone. Similar procedures can probably be applied to other countries, to 
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examine whether the development found for Norway also applies to other institutional and 
geographical settings. 
 
The starting point is the information provided by the detailed tabulations of incomes by ranges as used 
by Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) in their study of top income shares in Norway. Section 2 of this 
paper describes the tabulated data available from the published income tax records from 1875 
(annually from 1892) and in the form of micro-data from 1967 onwards. The tax information is a rich 
source, but it varies in form from year to year, and is limited in coverage, as it excludes non-taxpayers. 
The incomplete coverage of the population by the tax data means that there is a challenge involved in 
seeking to measure overall income inequality, as represented here by the Gini coefficient.  We meet 
this challenge by creating “upper” and “lower” bounds on the Gini coefficient. Section 3 gives an 
account of the data and assumptions that are used to arrive at these bounds. In particular, we rely on 
aggregate information from the municipal and central government tax records, which are available 
annually for a long period.  Combining these data with assumptions about the relative positions of 
different groups allow us to narrow the bounds on the estimated Gini coefficient. To this end, we add a 
further source of evidence about incomes at the bottom of the scale: administrative data on the number 
of recipients of public assistance, and the average amounts received.  
 
The mixed tabulated data provide detailed information on the upper part of the Lorenz curve even in 
the 19th century, but less information on the lower part of the Lorenz curve. As is well known, the 
Lorenz curve is an increasing convex function taking values between 0 and 1.  For distribution 
functions that are skewed to the right (heavy right tail), the Lorenz curve will exhibit weak 
(approximately linear) curvature in the lower part and strong convex curvature at the very top. Thus, to 
obtain a reliable estimate of the Lorenz curve for right-skewed distributions, it is necessary to have 
access to detailed tabular data for the top of the Lorenz curve, whereas it is sufficient to know a few 
points of the Lorenz curve below the median. As will be demonstrated in Sections 3 and 4, such 
tabular data constitute an appropriate basis for using a non-parametric approach to estimate the Gini 
coefficient and any alternative measure of inequality that are explicitly expressed in terms of the 
Lorenz curve. 
 
By deconstructing overall Gini inequality with respect to measures of affluence and poverty, we show 
in Section 5 that overall inequality is governed very much by what happens to inequality in the 
distribution of income in the top half of the distribution and to the ratio between the mean incomes of 
the lower and upper halves of the population, which means that the estimates of the overall Gini 
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coefficient are less sensitive to assumptions made on how the income attributable to non-taxpayers is 
distributed. However, as demonstrated in Section 4 this does not mean that the evolution of the income 
shares of the top 1 or top 10 per cent provides a complete picture of long-run income inequality in 
Norway.  
 
A second objective of this paper is to provide new insight into long-run income inequality in Norway. 
The results presented in Sections 4 and 5 show that income inequality was high until the end of the 
1930s, with substantial changes during the First World War. The turning point and origin of the low 
post-war inequality came with the German occupation between 1940 and 1945. The decline in 
inequality continued until the mid-1950s and remained stable at a low level between 1953 and 1980, 
but has increased steadily but moderately since 1980.  Section 6 elaborates on how our results on the 
long-run evolution of income inequality contribute to an understanding of economic development in 
Norway since the late 19th century. It is shown to be a rich story that can be considered in terms of 
episodes of change. 
1.1. Relationship with previous research 
Our paper offers evidence of changes in inequality of the overall income distribution over a period of 
almost 150 years, and shows that changes in the ratio between the mean incomes of the upper and 
lower halves of the income distribution and in the inequality in the distribution of incomes among the 
richest 50 per cent explain most of the changes in overall inequality. Apart from Atkinson and Søgaard 
(2016), who have had access to detailed annual income tabulations for the majority of the population 
in Denmark, previous research relies on less informative data and has mostly provided limited 
evidence on income inequality for selected years before 1945. Moreover, many of the scattered 
estimates of the overall distribution that do exist for earlier years are not comparable with modern 
series. The estimates for the United States provided by Spahr for 1890 and by King for 1910 (see 
Merwin, 1939) have been described in a review paper by Williamson and Lindert (1980, p. 91) as 
“eclectic size distribution guesses”, with the conclusion that “it is better to pass over these”. 
Williamson (1985) has produced estimates for the Gini coefficient for England and Wales, and 
Scotland, for selected years ranging from 1688 to 1915. None of these estimates can readily be linked 
to the modern series, but are made available in separate tables in a survey by Lindert (2000).  Kuznets 
(1955) provided a comparative study by compiling income distribution estimates for a few scattered 
years for the United States, United Kingdom and Germany. Milanovic (2016, Chapter 2) collected 
evidence for several pre-industrial economies (based on social tables, wealth data and some income-
based inequality series) and argues that inequality varies cyclically over time. 
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To our knowledge, there are three bodies of academic work that attempt to produce comparable 
estimates of overall inequality from the early twentieth century (or earlier) and onwards. First, 
Atkinson and Søgaard (2016) have estimated the Gini coefficient for Denmark for 1870 and from 
1903 to 2010 based exclusively on annual detailed tax-based income tabulations, which emerge as an 
extraordinarily informative dataset compared to historic data from other countries. The Danish dataset 
suffers however, from a series break in 1970 when the unit of account changes from family to 
individual. Moreover, the Danish dataset only contains detailed tabulation for one year in the 19th 
century. Secondly, Vecchi (2017, p. 331) reports estimates of the income Gini coefficient for Italy 
between 1861 and 1931. The estimates of the early period are constructed by fitting a generalized beta 
distribution on household budget data, and these series has been supplemented with tax-based 
estimates for the later period. Thus, the overall series may suffer from weak comparability, whereas 
the estimates of the early period may depend heavily on the chosen parametric distribution. Thirdly, 
Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret and Piketty (2018) extend their previous series of top income shares in 
France by including estimates for the bottom 10 per cent as well as the 10-50 per cent from 1900 until 
1985 (and a more complete income distribution after 1985).1 Atkinson et al. (2017) provide a review 
of historic income inequality estimates, including how data points from separate studies can be merged 
to construct long-run series of income inequality for the United States (from 1918) and the United 
Kingdom (from 1938).2 These estimates suggest that income inequality decreased in the early 
twentieth century and increased from the early 1980s, but reliable results are still not available for 
sufficiently many countries to justify a general trend. The longest previous series for income 
inequality in Norway were reported by Soltow (1965), who constructed a series of Gini coefficients 
based on samples of tax records for selected years between 1850 and 1960 for eight cities in southern 
Norway. The results of Soltow (1965) show decreasing income inequality among taxpayers living in 
these cities. 
 
The methodological approach of the present paper extends previous analyses by combining detailed 
tabulations of income tax data for a limited proportion of the population with income data from other 
sources. For most years, we have access to detailed tabulations for the top of the income distribution.  
These data are supplemented by annual aggregate data from two different taxation schemes (municipal 
                                                     
1 Before 1970, Garbinti et al. (2018) assume constant income shares within the bottom 90 per cent, e.g. the following shares 
are assumed to be constant for all years in the period 1900-1970 in France: the income of the lower 10 per cent is 0.39 per 
cent of the total for the bottom 90 per cent, the next 40 (10-50) 26.30 per cent and the next 40 again (50-90) 73.31 per cent. 
See Appendix Table TD3 to Garbinti et al. 
2 Kopczuk et al. (2010) provide evidence of earnings inequality  in the United States from 1937 onwards based on social 
security data and Kuhn et al. (2017) have produced estimates of income inequality for the United States starting in 1949.  
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and central government taxes) and from poverty statistics. As is demonstrated in this paper, the shape 
of the Lorenz curves for right-skewed income distributions makes it feasible to use a non-parametric 
approach to estimate the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient when detailed tabulations are available 
at the top of the income distribution and aggregate data provide estimates of a few points of the Lorenz 
curve for the lower half of the income distribution.3 By contrast, Garbinti et al. (2018)  rely on the 
condition of constant income shares for the lower 90 per cent, while Blanchet, Fournier and Piketty 
(2017) and Vecchi (2017)  rely on parametric distributions for broad intervals as a basis for estimating 
the overall income distribution.  
 
The limited evidence on the evolution of overall inequality in the literature has been supplemented 
with useful information on the evolution of top income shares, not least owing to the top income books 
edited by Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010) and the extensive review provided by Roine and 
Waldenstrom (2015). Several studies combine results for the overall income distribution in modern 
times with estimates of top income shares for earlier years. For example, Piketty, Saez, and Zucman 
(2016) report top income shares and estimates of the functional income distributions for the United 
States back to 1913, but provide no information on overall income distribution before 1964. Some 
studies suggest that top income shares could be a good proxy for overall inequality. The evidence 
provided by Leigh (2007), Roine and Waldenström (2015) and Morelli, Smeeding and Thompson 
(2015) is however mixed. The call for prudence made by Morelli et al. (2015) is supported by the 
present paper. Actually, we demonstrate that top income shares might give a misleading picture of the 
evolution of overall income inequality, partly because changes in top income shares are normally 
accompanied by significant changes in the distribution of incomes in the upper half of the income 
distribution as well as by changes in the ratio between the mean incomes of the upper and lower halves 
of the population.   
2. Income tax data in Norway 
We begin with a brief account of Norwegian income tax data, and the way in which they can be used 
to produce results for income distribution as a whole. Since similar data are available for most 
countries, the method introduced below might be used as a recipe for estimating historical Gini series. 
This section is principally concerned with the years from 1875 up to 1951 when the published data are 
more fragmentary and vary in coverage. From 1952, the tabulations are more detailed, and from 1967 
                                                     
3 An illustration of the shape of Lorenz curves for Pareto distributions is displayed in Appendix D. 
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to the present we have access to micro-data. The income data originate directly from tax records (they 
are not inferred from taxes paid).   
 
The same income definition, "antatt inntekt" (assessed income), is used over the entire period. It refers 
to income before tax (including capital income, taxable capital gains, taxable transfers and pension 
income), but after some pre-tax deductions. The pre-tax deductions represented relatively small 
amounts until the mid-1980s and were related to the expenses that were deemed necessary for the 
acquisition of income (Historical Statistics 1994, p. 280). For the period where excluding such 
deductions from our income measure might create a bias - the late 1980s onwards - we show by using 
an alternative measure of income that the pattern of the historic series is similar to the pattern based on 
a more comprehensive income measure for this period.4 Self-employment income was accounted for 
by assessing  the productive capacity of farms (in particular smaller farms) and deriving figures from 
company accounts.  
 
The tax unit (nuclear family), which is either a married couple or a single individual, defines the unit 
of analysis in this study. This choice is dictated by the tax statistics, as married couples were taxed 
jointly until 2018.  
2.1. The income tax data from 1875 
The income tax sources are municipal (MUN) and central government (CG) tax assessments: 
Kommunenes skattelikning and Statsskattelikningen.5 The key feature here is that, for a number of 
years, the government has published tabulations of the distribution of income tax payers by income 
range. The sources are listed in Appendix B. In addition, we have data on the total number of MUN 
and CG taxpayers for all years, starting in 1892, as well as the total income earned by each group. As 
the MUN tax data are more extensive (tax thresholds are lower and more people pay MUN than CG 
tax), we assume that CG taxpayers are a subset of MUN taxpayers. Given the similar tax base and the 
way these sources are treated in the tax statistics, this is a reasonable assumption. 
 
                                                     
4 Liberalization of the credit market in 1984-1985 combined with the right to deduct interest expenses and high marginal tax 
rates on capital incomes until the tax system was reformed in 1992 encouraged households to borrow, which led to a 
significant rise in interest deductions. However, although these reforms might have weakened the comparability of the 
historic income data, it should be noted that the evolution of the Gini coefficient for income after tax since the mid-1980s as 
displayed in Figure 4 in Section 3 is consistent with the evolution found for the historic Gini series over this period. 
5 This information, and further information below, comes from Gerdrup (1998) and the Introduction to Part XIII of Historisk 
Statistikk (HS) 1968. 
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The coverage of the detailed income tax tabulations varies over the period. CG tax was introduced in 
1892, so there is only distributional information on MUN tax for the years prior to that. The published 
tabulations for 1892 to 1903 only relate to CG tax, and the same applies to 1938 and 1948-1951.  To 
summarize, in decreasing order of completeness, over the period up to 1951: 
(i) MUN and CG distributional data: 1906, 1913 and 1929; 
(ii) MUN distributional data: 1875 and 1888; 
(iii) CG distributional data: 1892-1903, 1938, 1948-1951. 
 
We supplement the distributional data with the data on the total number of taxpayers and their total 
income, which is available for nearly all years. This means that, in addition to the Lorenz curve from 
the distributional data, we have in case (iii) a further point corresponding to the total MUN taxpayers 
(and hence total taxpayers).   
 
The tabulations of taxpayers by income range from 1952 to 1966, which precede the micro-data 
available from 1967, vary in their coverage (see below). Income is equal to income as assessed by 
municipal tax assessment for the years 1952-55.  In the tabulations for the years 1957 to 1966, income 
is defined as income as assessed by central government tax assessment if central government tax is 
levied. If not, income is defined as income as assessed by municipal tax assessment. There are no data 
for 1956 on account of the introduction of Pay-as-You Earn. 
 
Since 1967, all individual incomes have been available on computer files at Statistics Norway. The 
income concept used is "antatt inntekt", income after some standard deductions, which is the same 
definition as that used in the pre-1967 tabulations. Using data from the Central Population Register, 
we merge married couples into single units, adding together the incomes of husband and wife to form 
the nuclear family. An adjustment is required for the data from 1960 to 1967 to account for changes in 
tax unit definitions, as explained in Appendix E.’ 
 
In the period 1921-1947, corporate incomes (as well as individual incomes) are included in the 
aggregates in the tax statistics publications. From 1937 onwards, we can obtain figures for individuals 
from other sources; between 1921 and 1936 we make adjustments to the totals based on observed rates 
from 1937-1947.  
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2.2. Control totals 
The CG and MUN income tax tabulations for the late 18th and early 19th century do not cover 
significant proportions of the population as a whole. In order to arrive at an estimate of overall income 
inequality for the entire population, rather than only for the taxpayers, this study uses estimates of total 
number of tax units and total household income as starting points. The sources of these “control totals” 
are described in Appendix C.  The first step in calculating total tax units is the adult population, 
defined here as those aged 16 and over. The second step is to subtract the number of married women. 
Defined in this way, the tax unit population (nuclear families) as reported in the population statistics 
increases from 847,000 in 1875 to 1.7 million in 1951 and 3.4 million in 2017. In 1875, 83 per cent of 
nuclear families were covered by the tax statistics. In 1892, this figure had decreased to 52 per cent. 
The share subsequently increased gradually to 80 per cent by 1920. During the next period it 
decreased, to 66 per cent in 1933, and subsequently increased again, reaching 86 per cent in 1951. As 
explained below, after 1951 we rely on several different tabulations that together cover the entire 
population. 
 
For total income, we use total household income for 1978 to 2017 from the National Accounts (NA) 
and extrapolate backwards using comparable historical series (see Appendix C). The resulting series 
for total household income as measured by the national accounts exceeds the total income recorded in 
the tax statistics (the internal total) in three main respects. First, the omission of the income of those 
not covered by the tax statistics. Second, understatement of income in the tax statistics. Third, 
differences in income definitions. Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) observed that the highest percentage 
for total NA household income recorded in the tax statistics was 72, and thus chose 72 per cent of NA 
household income as control total. We use the same approach. 6 Total household income as measured 
by the NA is made up of (i) compensation of employees (not including employers’ social security 
contributions), (ii) operating surplus of self-employed businesses, (iii) property income, (iv) transfers 
from government and from abroad, and (v) income not classified elsewhere. A comparison of the 
control total from the National Accounts and the total from the tax statistics is given in the left panel 
of Figure 1 and in Appendix C (Table A5 and Figures A3-A4).   
                                                     
6 Aaberge and Atkinson (2010, p. 476) provide further details and indicate that a similar approach has been used for Sweden 
and the United Kingdom.  
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Figure 1. Total income from tax statistics and control total (left panel) and mean income per tax 
unit (right panel). In 2017 NOK 
 
Note: "Control total" refers to the total income one would obtain based on official (reconstructed) national accounts data, 
with the caveats explained in the main text. "Tax unit" refers to married couples and single individuals.  
 
The control totals provide estimates of the mean income per tax unit, which is displayed in real terms 
(as 2017 NOK) in the right-hand panel of Figure 1.  In the period since 1875, real income has risen by 
a factor of around 13.7 But the growth has not been steady.  Before 1914 there was an irregular pattern 
of recessions and recoveries. The inter-war period saw little improvement in real incomes. The post- 
World War II period, in contrast, experienced rapid growth up to the mid-1970s, which later slowed 
and was interrupted by the recession and banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
3. Estimating the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient 
We now move to the estimation of the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient based on the data on MUN 
and CG taxpayers as well as the control total. Given that the data are typically incomplete, we have to 
                                                     
7 GDP per capita (in fixed prices) has grown by a factor of 18 over the same period. The discrepancy is largely due to the 
extensive  demographic changes during this period; in 1985 Norway had a much younger population. The total population 
grew by a factor of 2.8 from 1875 to 2013, while total tax units (as defined here) grew by a factor of 3.6. 
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make assumptions and work throughout with an upper and lower bound Gini coefficient. By 
consistently choosing assumptions that lead to higher inequality for the upper bound and lower 
inequality for the lower bound, we are able to efficiently bracket the true Gini coefficient that we 
would obtain if we had full information on the exact incomes of all nuclear families, and also to obtain 
a measure of the precision of our estimates.  
 
The discussion in this section will be based on the available Norwegian historical data sources 
described in Section 2. However, the existence of several types of income tax as well as data on social 
assistance is by no means unique to Norway in this period. For this reason, the methods proposed here, 
utilizing tabular data to assess points on the Lorenz curve, are also applicable to other countries.  
3.1. Estimation of Lorenz curves 
The Lorenz curve plots cumulative income shares (on the vertical axis) against cumulative proportions 
of the population (on the horizontal axis), with the population ordered from low-income to high-
income individuals. This means that the Lorenz curve will always be a convex function below the 
diagonal, as illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 2. It is well-known that the Gini coefficient is defined by 
twice the area between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve. Hence, the bounds on the Lorenz curves 
constructed here correspond directly to bounds on the estimated Gini coefficients. A basic feature of 
the data used in this paper is that in all years, taxpayers amount to more than 50 per cent of the 
population, and that the total number of taxpayers and their income are reported annually. The annual 
aggregates from the municipal and central government tax statistics provide accurate estimates for 
several points on the Lorenz curve every year.  
 
Different formats of the overall Lorenz curves are shown in panel (b) of Figure 2, which illustrates the 
case where we have distributional information on MUN taxpayers (with or without information on CG 
taxpayers) and panel (c) of Figure 2, which illustrates the case where we have only aggregate 
information on MUN taxpayers. In our estimates, we assume that the total population of tax units is 
correctly measured by our control total.  The difference between this total and the total recorded in the 
income tax tabulations is referred to as the “missing population”.  Moreover, we assume that all 
individuals not represented in the statistics on MUN and CG taxpayers have incomes lower than those 
who pay tax. This means that the Lorenz curve for taxpayers is scaled down and connected with the 
final point for the missing population.  In the case shown, the individuals in the missing population are 
all assumed to have identical incomes, so the first section of the Lorenz curve is a straight line. Further 
assumptions made about the distribution within the missing population are discussed below. Points H1 
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and H2 are points on the Lorenz curve constructed from MUN and CG taxpayer data.  Panel (c) of 
Figure 2 shows the case where there is no tabulated MUN data, only aggregates. On the assumption 
that those paying MUN tax but not CG tax all receive the mean income, the Lorenz curve for this 
group is represented by the dotted line.  
 
Figure 2. Estimation of Lorenz curves from tabular data  
 
Figure note: Figure 2 shows how Lorenz curves are estimated on the basis of tabular data and assumptions of within-group 
distributions. Panel (a) shows the definition of the Lorenz curve as a plot of cumulative income shares against cumulative 
population proportions, where the diagonal line illustrates a hypothetical distribution with complete equality and the line 
tracing the lower and right corner of the figure illustrating extreme inequality (one tax unit owns the total income). Panel (b) 
illustrates how a Lorenz curve with distributional information for taxpayers (with two points H1 and H2 known from tabular 
data) is combined with the proportion of the population who pay tax to arrive at a Lorenz curve for the overall distribution. 
"Missing population" refers to the share of the population who are not covered by the income tax statistics. Panel (c) 
illustrates a Lorenz curve with two groups of taxpayers: those paying both central government (CG) and municipal (MUN) 
tax (denoted "CG taxpayers") and those paying only the municipal (MUN) tax. In this example, the distribution among the 
CG taxpayers as well as the proportion of the population not paying income tax are known. Panel (d) shows our baseline 
specification with four population groups, where the missing population is divided into those who receive poverty assistance 
(the assisted poor) and those who do not receive poverty asistance (the "non-assisted, non-taxed", NA/NT population). In this 
panel, we have applied within-group distributions for the central government taxpayers as well as for people who only pay 
municipal tax. For further details of estimation and definitions, see the text below. 
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The income attributable to the missing population is one element contributing to the difference 
between the income control total described above and the total income recorded in the tax statistics, 
where the latter is referred to as the “internal total”.  In the period 1875 to 1951, there was a difference 
of around 20 per cent between the internal and control totals (see Figure A3), apart from during World 
War I. In our estimates, total income is taken as equal to the control total. This means that we can 
consider bounds on the Gini coefficient in terms of allocating the difference either to under-reporting 
in the tax data or to the missing population. Suppose that the amount by which the control total 
exceeds the internal total is equal to a proportion, α, of the internal total, and that a proportion β of the 
internal total represents under-statement in the tax data. This leaves (α-β) times internal total income to 
be allocated to the missing population, or (α-β)/(1+α) times overall control income. If non-taxpayers 
constitute a fraction n of the total population, then the amount allocated per head to the missing 
population, expressed relative to the overall mean, is (α-β)/[n(1+α)].  This would be the overall slope 
of the first segment of the Lorenz curve in this example.  
3.2. Implications for the Gini coefficient 
The implications for the Gini coefficient are most easily seen in terms of the area under the Lorenz 
curve, since the Gini coefficient is equal to 1 minus twice the area under the Lorenz curve.  For 
taxpayers alone, twice the area is equal to 
 
(1) B  =  ΔF1 H1 + ΔF2 {H1+H2} + … + ΔFk {Hk-1+1} 
 
where ΔFi is the density in the range and Hi denotes the cumulative share of total income up to and 
including range i, where there are k ranges.  It follows that the Gini coefficient for taxpayers alone is 
 
(2) 1G B = −   
 
The introduction of the missing population as in panel (b) of Figure 2 has two effects. It squeezes the 
Lorenz curve for taxpayers to the right. In equation (1), this does not affect Hi but reduces ΔFi, and 
hence the area B, by a factor (1-n). The second effect is that it adds additional area under the first 
segment. If it is assumed that all incomes are non-negative, then the least such addition is zero (i.e. β is 
set equal to α), in the case where the Lorenz curve in panel (c) of Figure 2 initially follows the 
horizontal axis. Together, these two effects give an upper bound UG  for the overall Gini coefficient, 
which can be expressed 
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(3) (1 ) (1 )UG n n G G n G
  = + − = + −  
 
It is a weighted average of 1 and G . In 1875, for example, values of n = 16.8 per cent and G  = 47.6 
per cent imply that the upper bound is 56.4 per cent.  
 
Conversely, a lower bound might be sought by allocating all the difference to the missing population 
(β is set equal to 0), but this may violate the assumption that the missing population have incomes 
below the lowest income of taxpayers. Moreover, for some years there is contemporary evidence on 
which we can draw. For 1875, the tabulations published by Kiær (1892-3), which we are using, 
include an estimate of the numbers and income of the missing population.8  The mean for the range 
NOK  0 – NOK 400 was NOK 230, which was 40.9 per cent of the overall mean. If, as an illustration, 
we attribute this amount per unit to the missing tax units, it means that, of the uplift moving from the 
NOK 345.5 million internal total to the NOK 475.8 million control total, 32.6 million NOK, or 28.3 
per cent of the uplift, is allocated to the missing population.  
 
The lower bound adopted here is calculated by considering the area under the Lorenz curve, where the 
missing population is allocated a fraction h of total income.  Twice the area under the Lorenz curve is 
therefore increased by h times n.  At the same time, the Lorenz curve for taxpayers is squeezed 
vertically by a scale factor (1-h), reducing its area but adding a rectangle, which adds 2h(1-n). The 
resulting lower bound Gini coefficient is 
 
(4) (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )L UG n n G h n G G h n G
     = + − − + − = − + −      
 
The last term shows that the difference between the upper and lower bounds – a measure of our 
uncertainty about the extent of income inequality in that year – increases, as we would expect, by the 
value of h, magnified by a factor of (1+ (1-n) G ).    The 1875 value of h = 8.6 per cent, coupled with 
n = 16.8 and G = 47.6 per cent, generates a difference of 9.6 percentage points from the upper bound, 
or a value of 46.8 per cent for the lower bound.  
                                                     
8 Incomes below NOK 400 were exempt from taxation. 
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3.3. Using aggregate taxpayer data  
For certain years, we have only the aggregate number and total income of the MUN taxpayers who are 
not liable for CG tax, and nothing is known about the distribution among this intermediate group. (We 
do however know the distribution among CG taxpayers.)  This is the situation shown in panel (c) of 
Figure 2. 
 
Let us denote the proportion of the population in the MUN-CG group by m, the proportion of CG 
taxpayers by c, and the proportion of those in neither group by n (so c+m+n = 1).  The contributions 
of the three groups to the overall Gini coefficient may be seen in panel (c) of Figure 2. Denote the 
income share of the bottom group by h, and the combined share of the bottom two groups by g. 
Subtracting twice the area under the Lorenz curve from 1 gives the overall Gini coefficient: 
 
(5)  1 ( ) 1 (1 )G hn g h m c g g G = − + + + + − −    
 
where G  is the Gini coefficient for the CG taxpayers. This may be re-written by introducing a new 
parameter g' = g-h and replacing g with (g′+h) as 
 
(5a)    1 (1 ) (1 ) 1G c g G g m c g h m cG   = + − − + + − + +   
 
The upper bound is obtained by setting h = 0 and keeping the other parameters constant.   The final 
term in (5a) shows that the difference between G and the upper bound is proportional to h, with a 
magnification factor that is less than 3, but which may nonetheless be substantial. In 1892, the first 
year for which there is CG data, m = 36.6 per cent, c = 18.8 per cent and G  = 44.8 per cent, so that 
the magnification factor is 1.45. 
 
What, if anything, can we say about years for which there are no detailed tabulations for CG 
taxpayers? The formula (5a) allows us to see the role played by inequality within the group of CG 
taxpayers when h = 0.  The term c(1-g′)G  is an addition to the overall Gini coefficient.  Suppose that 
we do not know G , but do know c and g′?  Then the difference between the bounds would be 
widened to an extent that depends on the product of the population share and the income share of the 
CG taxpayers.  Whereas the product may have been small in the nineteenth century, it was 
substantially higher in World War I and later. On the other hand, in the years for which we have 
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tabulations, the Gini coefficient among taxpayers has rarely exceeded 50 per cent or (apart from two 
exceptions) fallen below 30 per cent.  
3.4. Using data on the assisted poor 
In order to provide a more solid basis for our treatment of the lower part of the distribution, we need 
additional information on the incomes of those below the tax threshold.  In search of this, we explore 
one possible source: administrative data on the number of recipients of public assistance and the 
average amounts received. It is assumed that the recipient unit can be equated to the tax unit and that 
the poverty assistance is the same as subsistence market income. This means that all 
individuals/couples are assumed to have positive market income (where some could have zero); on the 
other hand, some of the recipients of assistance might also receive small amounts of market income.  
 
In effect, using this additional administrative information means introducing into the three-group 
model a fourth group, by dividing those not paying tax into those who are assisted (the “assisted 
poor”) and those who are neither assisted nor taxed (NA/NT). The key assumption underlying our 
construction of the Lorenz curves and calculation of the Gini coefficient is that the groups can be 
ranked in order of increasing income, as shown in panel (d) of Figure 2.  As liability for taxation 
depends on both income and wealth, there could be cases where people are liable for MUN taxation on 
account of wealth (and hence are included in the tax authorities' calculations of the number and total 
income of MUN taxpayers) but have low incomes that would place them below people in the NA/NT 
group. But it seems a reasonable approximation. 
 
When the proportion of assisted poor is denoted by p, the proportion in the NA/NT group by n, and the 
share of the first group by a, the Gini coefficient is now given by 
 
(6)  1 (1 ) ( ) ( ) 1G c g G a n p g c m c h m p cG  = + − − + − + − − + − +  
 
The population proportions, p, n, m and c are known.  The total income received by the assisted poor 
and by the two groups of taxpayers is known. The total income of the NA/NT group is not reported in 
the tax statistics. Here we have to make assumptions regarding the upper and lower bounds, but with 
the advantage that this group – given our earlier assumption – is “sandwiched” between two groups 
about which we have information. The upper bound is calculated on the assumption that the NA/NT 
group has the same average income as the assisted poor, the lower bound on the assumption that the 
average income of the NA/NT group is equal to one third of the average income of the MUN-CG 
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group.9 For some years, the MUN-CG mean income turns out  to be less than three times the mean 
poverty support. In these cases, the imputed income for the NA/NT group will be the same for the 
upper and lower bounds.10 
 
Expression (6) for the Gini coefficient does not account for possible dispersion within any of the three 
groups with lowest incomes. However, the POOR and NA/NT groups are always relatively small and, 
given our assumption that groups are ranked by income, limited by the income ranges of neighbor 
groups (or zero, in the case of the poor). This puts a strict upper limit on the contribution to the overall 
Gini that could result from within-group dispersion in these groups. For example, the maximum 
consistent inequality in the poorest group would mean that the richest individuals in this group had the 
same income as the NA/NT mean income and the poorest individuals in this group had zero income. 
The effect of such a distribution would be largest in 1888, where the lower bound Gini measured in 
percentage points would increase only from 56.91 to 56.93.11 
 
On the other hand, the MUN-CG group constitutes a relatively large proportion of the population, and 
the data show that the differences between the MUN-CG and CG mean incomes are substantial. For 
this reason, within-group dispersion is introduced for the MUN-CG group. Specifically, the incomes 
within this group are assumed to follow a uniform distribution. The details of this imputation are given 
in Appendix D, where the relationship between the dispersion parameter z and the within-group MUN-
                                                     
9 A number of further adjustments have to be made to the published tabulations in making these 4-group 
calculations. Assumptions are required when estimating the upper and lower bounds.  For G , if the within-
group Gini of the CG taxpayers is not available, the upper bound uses the maximum of the previous and the next 
observations of G . Similarly, the lower bound uses the minimum of the previous and the next observation if 
there are no data available. For the years 1875 to 1891, when there were no CG taxation, the average income of 
the NA/NT group for the upper bound Gini is taken as NOK 150. NOK 150 was 25 per cent of the mean income 
of workers and 33 per cent of the mean income of farmers (including cotters) in 1888/89 (Sth. Prp. Nr 48, 
1890).). Note that our "upper bound inequality" applies within the framework of assumptions outlined in this 
chapter. If, for example, we assume that the entire difference between total income from the tax statistics and 
national accounts was entirely "hidden income" that accrued exclusively to the rich, inequality would be 
higher.Given the nature of the tax system we do not find this assumption plausible. The lower bounds are 
assessed within the framework of the control total as described in Section 2.2. 
10 Alternatively, one could attribute zero income to recipients of poverty support on the grounds that one wanted 
the income definition to respect a strict "pre-tax" definition. A counter-argument is that the poverty support is 
likely to reflect the subsistence income received by these households. Changing the income level of the poor to 
zero (while maintaining the income levels for the NANT group) would increase the Gini coefficient by between 
0.004 and 0.036. Results from this exercise are available on request. 
11 Graphically, we obtain the upper bound from 5 by extending the line for the NA/NT group (the slope of this group is the 
mean income of NA/NT relative to the population mean) down to zero. The resulting triangle (the contribution of the poor 






). Introducing dispersion to the NA/NT group would decrease the 
maximum consistent contribution from the poor group. 
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CG Gini coefficient 3G z
 =  is explained. As we maintain the assumption that there is no overlap 
between the income groups, there is a limit to the upper value of z. Overall, a value of z=0.4 is 
consistent with the introduction of some dispersion without any MUN-CG taxpayers having either 
higher incomes than the lowest in the CG-group or lower incomes than the NA/NT group. Note, 
however, that the overall Gini coefficient proves to be insensitive to changes in z. 
 
Finally, in 1875 and 1888 (the years before the introduction of CG tax in 1892) there was no state 
taxation, but instead detailed tabulations of the incomes of MUN taxpayers. We then assume that the 
lowest tabulated income group in the MUN tabulations is equivalent to the MUN-CG group in later 
years, and that the higher-income groups would have been subject to CG tax had that been in effect in 
these years. 
3.5. Estimation of benchmark series from 1875 to 1951 
The comprehensive approach described in Section 0 provides the basis for our analysis of the long-run 
evolution of inequality in Norway in this paper. The Gini coefficient for the years 1875, 1888 and 
1892-1951 will then be given by  
 
(7) G = 1 - pa - n(a+h) - m(2h+g') - c(1+g'+h) +c(1-g'-h) G ) + g'mG  
 
where   
a = total income of the poor relative to control total,  
h = total income of the poor and non-assisted/non-taxed (NA/NT) relative to control total,  
g' = total income of MUN taxpayers who are not CG taxpayers,  
p = the poor as proportion of total tax units,  
n = NA/NT as proportion of total tax units,  
m = MUN-CG taxpayers (those who pay municipal tax but not central government tax) as proportion 
of total tax units,  
c = CG taxpayers as proportion of total tax units,  
G = Gini coefficient among MUN-CG taxpayers, 
G = Gini coefficient among CG taxpayers.  
 
Expression (7) takes as its starting point extreme inequality where the Lorenz curve follows the 
horizontal axis between 0 and 1. The first four terms then subtract the areas of the triangles and 
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parallelograms below the Lorenz curve as illustrated in Figure 2. The latter two terms add in the 
within-group Gini coefficients for the two richest groups, scaled by group sizes and income shares. 12  
3.6. Bounds for 1952 to the present 
The above discussion has described the bounds applied for the period 1875 to 1951.  For the post-1951 
period, when coverage was greater, relatively high numbers of tabulated intervals have been published 
by Statistics Norway (Historical Statistics 1978). From 1967 onwards the incomes of the entire 
population of taxpayers are available as micro data. For this reason, the set of necessary assumptions 
for this period is smaller, similar to the situation shown in Figure 2, where the assumptions relate only 
to the mean income of the missing population. These assumptions are designed to be comparable with 
those for the earlier period, while taking account of the changing role of assistance to the poor in the 
1960s and later. In particular, there is a break in the poverty support series between 1964 and 1967, 
making mean payout per supported individual a less appropriate value for imputation at the lower end 
of the income distribution. 
 
The upper bound of the Gini coefficient is based on the assumptions that (i) those not covered by the 
tax tabulations have a mean income equal to mean assistance (as before) for the years up to 1964 and 
(ii) from 1967 the group receives 50 per cent of the minimum pension for a single person.13  The lower 
bound is based on the assumption that those not covered by the tax tabulations receive mean income 
equal to 150 per cent of the mean income assumed for the upper bound. 
 
We should emphasize at this point that the final series is based on a consistent population throughout 
the period. Despite the change from household-based to individual-based taxation, we can replicate 
pre-1960 nuclear families in the post-1966 microdata by merging spouses using personal ID numbers 
in the latter data that link taxpayers and the population recorded as individuals. The first year in which 
married women could choose to file taxes individually is 1960. We therefore transform individual data 
for the years 1960-1966 into household-based data using data from the 1960 census as well as the 
distribution of spouse's incomes, marriage and tax status in 1967. Similarly, adjustments are made to 
                                                     
12 While the Gini coefficient is calculated directly from (7), we can also construct Lorenz curves using the assumptions 
outlined here. These are available as an online appendix. In this case, a Pareto distribution is imposed for the richest (CG) 
group, with the dispersion and lower bound parameters set to match the mean income and Gini coefficients of this group. As 
long as these two conditions are satisfied, the choice of within-group dispersion has no impact on the estimated Gini 
coefficient for the entire population or any part of the population that includes the entire CG group. 
13 For the years 1965 and 1966, the minimum pension was projected back from 1967 (when it was introduced) in line with 
the growth of seamen's pensions, which were introduced in 1950. The same process applied to 1964 yielded a figure of NOK 
2,140, which was close to the poverty support level in that year of NOK 1,975. 
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take account of a separate taxation system for sailors (1948-1966) and company taxation (1921-1947). 
These adjustments are all described in detail in Appendix D.  
3.7. Long-run inequality in Norway  
The results of the calculations discussed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 are brought together in Figure 3, 
which shows the upper and lower bounds for the Gini coefficient. The difference between the upper 
and lower bounds is largest for the pre-1914 period. The average difference over the period from 1892 
to 1914 is 9.8 percentage points, whereas the average difference from 1915 to 1951 is 2.2 percentage 
points. While the difference represents potential error introduced at the stage of data analysis and is 
not comparable with the sampling error typically considered in distributional analysis, it is nonetheless 
interesting to compare their magnitudes. From that perspective, the 1892 to 1914 figure appears quite 
large, but the 1915 to 1951 average difference is not dissimilar to the confidence intervals obtained 
from the reported standard errors for the Gini coefficients obtained from household surveys: for 
example, the 95 per cent confidence interval for the Gini coefficient of the distribution of disposable 
equivalent (household) income in Norway varied between 1.4 and 3.6 for the period 1986 to 1993.  
 
In Appendix A, we perform an evaluation of the sensitivity of estimates of the Gini coefficient to the 
employment of additional data sources, and a robustness check of the Gini series based on two 
measures of inequality that complement the information provided by the Gini coefficient. The results 
displayed in Figure A1 show how the estimated Gini coefficients depend on the choice of data for 
interpolating the Lorenz curve, starting with the simplest approach in Section 3.1 and increasing the 
sophistication of the method to arrive at our preferred estimate. It is shown that the Gini coefficients 
produced by the naive estimator are far too low. 
 
Irrespective of whether we use a measure of inequality that are particularly sensitive to changes that 
take place in either the lower or the upper part of the income distribution the evolution of the 
associated inequality estimates shows, as demonstrated by Figure A2 and Table A8, a similar pattern 
as the estimates of the Gini coefficient. However, the measure that is most sensitive to changes in the 
upper tail of the income distribution shows significantly larger relative changes than the Gini 
coefficient during the post-war period. Moreover, the Gini coefficient shows significantly larger 
relative changes than the measure that are most sensitive to changes that occur in the lower part of the 
income distribution. As will be demonstrated in Section 4.3, these results prove to be consistent with 
the information obtained by comparing the evolution of the overall Gini coefficient with the evolution 
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of the ratio of the upper and lower mean income, the upper tail Gini and the measure of affluence, 
which is discussed in Section 4. 
 
Figure 3. Gini coefficient for the distribution of income in Norway, 1875-2017. Upper and lower 
bounds 
 
Note: For sources, methods and assumptions, see text. "Lower bound" refers to inequality estimated using assumptions on 
average income level of the non-taxed and distribution among central government taxpayers that lead to lower inequality, 
while "upper bound" refers to inequality estimated using assumptions that lead to higher inequality. See Subsections 3.1-3.6. 
3.8. Different income definitions 
The standard "official" estimates of the Gini coefficient for the distribution of income in Norway 
accounts for taxation, public cash transfers as well as for the needs of household members and has 
been published since the mid-1980s. As indicated in the introduction our choice of definitions has 
been dictated by constraints in available historic data sources. This is why we have adopted a gross 
income definition, whereas statistical agencies today provide inequality estimates on the basis of 
disposable equivalent income.   
 
The closest Norway gets to an official definition of income inequality is Statistics Norway's time 
series from 1986 onwards.14 The construction of this series diverges from the approach used elsewhere 
                                                     
14 See http://www.ssb.no/inntekt-og-forbruk/statistikker/ifhus 
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in this paper in three ways. First, the household definition includes everyone living together with joint 
consumption except students not living at home. To account for scale economics the standard EU 
equivalence scale is used. Second, a somewhat larger set of income sources (various types of non-
taxable transfers) is included than the "gross income" concept used in this paper. Third, the income 
basis is post-tax rather than pre-tax. 
 
Figure 4 compares the evolution of the Gini coefficient since 1986 for the two alternative definitions 
of income. As expected, inequality in the "official" series is much lower than the long-term series. 
This is largely due to the redistributive effects of public transfers and a progressive tax system, but it 
also reflects the treatment of the income unit. The use of a wider definition tends to reduce recorded 
inequality, since it assumes a greater degree of income-sharing. Taking account of economies of scale 
in larger households has also a significant effect on the measured level of inequality. However, since 
our focus is on the evolution of inequality, we find it reassuring that the pattern of the historic series 
captures the pattern of the official series from 1986 onwards. Most important here is that the 
development of inequality over time is similar for the two definitions. There was a significant increase 
from 1986 to around 2000, turbulence around the tax reforms of the early 2000s and a slight increase 
thereafter.  
 
Figure 4. Gini coefficient for the distribution of income in Norway based on two alternative 
income definitions, 1986 - 2017
 
Note: The long run series is the average of the upper and lower bound reported in Figure 3. For sources, methods and 
assumptions, see text. 
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4.  The relationship between overall inequality and inequality at 
the top  
Although Eurostat, OECD and national statistical agencies publish top income shares, ratios of income 
quantiles and decile means on a regular basis, such quantities cannot be regarded as measures of 
inequality as they don’t satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. Thus, in order to provide 
information on overall inequality, these institutions regularly publish estimates of the Gini coefficient. 
Since most of the discussion of the long-run evolution of inequality in OECD countries concerns the 
increasing top income shares, it is interesting to explore what we learn from the new series of overall 
inequality (as in Figure 3) compared to the top income series previously published by Aaberge and 
Atkinson (2010).  To this end, we compare the evolution of the income shares of the top 1 per cent and 
overall inequality, where we take the mean of the upper and lower bounds of Figure 3 to give an 
“average series”.15  
4.1. The share of the top 1 per cent and the Gini coefficient 
When comparing top income shares and the Gini coefficient, it is useful to apply the following 
approximate decomposition proposed by Atkinson (2007, p. 19-20), and proved by Alvaredo (2011),  
 
(8) 𝐺 ≈ (1 − 𝑆) ∙ 𝐺𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚99% + 𝑆, 
 
where S is the income share of the top 1 per cent and 
99 %bottomG  is the Gini coefficient of the bottom 
99 per cent.16 The approximate decomposition of the Gini coefficient is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates that the evolution of the share of the top 1 per cent does not capture the 
evolution of income inequality in Norway, although overall inequality and top income shares have 
moved closely together in recent decades. Over the period 1882 to 1939 the Gini coefficient is seen to 
                                                     
15 The averaging is done because we recognize that what many researchers require is a single series, and that if we do not 
provide an average ourselves, users will do so. At the same time, there is no evident justification for taking a simple average.  
It can be argued that the upper bound attributes an unreasonably low income to those recording zero. The appropriate weights 
may vary over the time period.  But the simple average provides a point of reference.   
16 The exact decomposition is given by 
𝐺 = 0.01 ∙ 𝑆 ∙ 𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑝1% + (1 − 𝑆) ∙ 𝐺𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚99% − 0.01 ∙ (1 − 𝑆) ∙ 𝐺𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚99% + 𝑆 − 0.01, 
where the first, third and fifth terms are relatively small compared to the second and fourth terms, which justifies the 
simplified expression in (8). The first term in (8) is always 0.001 or less in our data, while the third term is maximum 0.005. 
The last term is constant at 0.01 by definition. Note that the top 1 per cent series shown here (and given in the Appendix) 
differs slightly from those published by Aaberge and Atkinson (2010), simply because the present series utilizes additional 
data sources, relies on different assumptions on the distribution of unmeasured income and uses interpolation of the top 
distribution across some years, as explained in Section 3. 
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vary significantly, even though the Gini coefficient measured in percentage points only declined 
modestly, from 64 per cent in 1882 to 59 per cent in 1939. By contrast, the share of the top 1 per cent 
decreased significantly, from 22 per cent to 13 per cent, over the same period, while the Gini of the 99 
per cent increased from 43 to 48 per cent. 
 
Figure 5. Decomposition of the Gini coefficient by the income share of the top 1 per cent and the 
Gini coefficient of the distribution of income among the bottom 99 per cent, Norway 1875 - 2017 
 
Note: The components are estimated using the same estimated Lorenz curves as were used for estimating the Gini 
coefficients in Figure 3. The graphs display the mean of the upper and lower bound estimates. For sources, methods and 
assumptions, see text. 
 
During the Second World War and the early post-war period, both overall inequality and top income 
shares showed a substantial decline. Between 1939 and 1953 the Gini coefficient fell from 59 per cent 
to 42 per cent, while the share of the top 1 per cent fell from 13 per cent to 6 per cent.   The evolution 
over the next three decades was again rather different. There was a substantial decline in the share of 
the top 1 per cent, from 6 per cent in 1953 to 4 per cent in 1980, whereas the Gini coefficient was 
fairly stable.   Since 1990, the share of the top 1 per cent has regained the lost ground, and was 10 per 
cent in 2017 according to our estimates here, and the Gini coefficient too has risen – although only to 
around 47 per cent. This difference between the time paths of the top shares and the Gini coefficient 
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shows that, while the top share may have driven much of the recent increase in overall inequality, 
there have been other forces in operation as a result of which not all of the post-war equalization has 
been lost. Note that the evolution of the share of the top 10 per cent parallels the evolution of the share 
of the top 1 per cent (see Aaberge and Atkinson, 2010). We refer to Online Appendix G for a 
decomposition of the Gini coefficient by the income share of the top 10 per cent and the Gini 
coefficient of the distribution of income among the bottom 90 per cent. Furthermore, Appendix G 
provides results of the evolution of decile-specific income shares. 
 
Since the evolution of top income shares and overall inequality differs in a number of periods, 
estimates on upper tail inequality and the ratio between the mean incomes of the lower and upper half 
of the population might provide essential information on whether changes in overall inequality are due 
to a widening of the income gap between the upper and lower half of the population and/or changes in 
the distribution of income among the richest 50 per cent of the population. As will be demonstrated 
below, these distributional measures contribute to explain the driving forces behind the evolution of 
overall inequality. 
4.2. Affluence 
Before World War II, taxpayers comprised between 52 and 81 per cent of the annual populations of 
tax units, which means that the data base for describing the upper half of the income distribution is 
richer than that for describing the lower half. This makes it particularly relevant to consider the 
evolution of the mean and the Gini coefficient for the most affluent 50 per cent of the population and 
use the associated estimates as a basis for estimating “affluence”, a measure introduced by Aaberge 
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where    is the overall mean income, U  and UG  are the mean and the Gini coefficient, respectively, 
of the richest 50 per cent of the population, L U  =  and  L  is the mean of the poorest 50 per 
cent of the population. Expression (9a) shows that affluence, A, increases with increasing inequality in 
the income distribution of the richest 50 per cent and decreases with increasing mean income ratio  17. 
                                                     
17 As demonstrated by the following expression 2( ) 1U  = −  there is one to one correspondence between   and U  .   
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Inserting the well-known expressions for U  and UG  into (9a) yields the following alternative 












= − − 
 
  , 
where 1( )F t−    is the income of the individual with rank t in the income distribution F  . 
Expression (9b) shows that A can be interpreted as a (normalized) weighted average of the 
income shares of the richest 50 per cent, where the weight increases with increasing rank from 
0 for the median income to 4/3 for the highest income. The affluence measure A has itself a 
range  0,1  and takes the value 0 if and only if all individuals receive the same income  . At 
the other extreme, when total income is received by one sole individual, then A takes the 
value 1. Note that 3A becomes equal to the relative affluence gap 
( )( ) (1 ) (1 )U    − = − +   if individuals with higher income than the median income 
receive the same income U .  The estimation results for affluence, A, and the upper tail 
(above median) Gini coefficient UG   are displayed in Figure 6. 
 
Since the available data provide a better basis for estimating affluence than overall inequality 
before World War II, it is reassuring that the affluence pattern largely captures the pattern of 
the overall Gini. Note also that the reliability of affluence (and the upper tail Gini coefficient) 
to a large extent carries over to the estimated overall Gini series. This is because income 
distributions are normally skewed to the right, which means that the upper tail Gini 
contributes a significantly larger share of the overall Gini than the lower tail Gini. Aaberge 
and Atkinson (2016) demonstrated that the overall Gini is equal to 3( ) 4A P+  , where P is 
the poverty counterpart of affluence (A).  Thus, in 1900, with G = 0.586 and A = 0.515 (see 
Table A8), the contribution from affluence to the overall G was 66 per cent, while the 
contribution of A had declined only marginally, to 62 per cent, a hundred years later.  To 
complement the information on inequality given by the Gini coefficient, Appendix A provides 
estimates of two closely related rank-dependent measures of inequality. The results show to be in line 
with the evidence provided by this section, i.e. changes in inequality from 1939 to 1980 and from 1980 
to 2017 largely concerned the upper part of the income distribution. 
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Figure 6. Gini coefficients for the overall distribution of income and the distribution of income 
for those with income above the median, and a measure of affluence, Norway 1875 - 2017  
 
Note: The components are estimated using the same distribution as the one used for estimating the Gini coefficients in Figure 
3. The graphs display the mean of upper and lower bound estimates. For sources, methods and assumptions, see text. 
5. Long-run inequality in Norway: A series of episodes 
The evolution of inequality in Norway is best characterized, we believe, as a series of episodes 
identified with sub-periods, which are summarized in Table 1. As demonstrated by the change in 
percentage points, the evolution of the overall Gini coefficient is closely related to the evolution of 
Gini-based affluence measure. In the same way, the upper tail Gini and the mean income ratio 
typically move in the opposite direction; rising (declining) upper tail Gini and declining (rising) mean 
income ratio. It is evident from Figure 6 that three episodic changes in income inequality deserve 
special mention. First, inequality was turbulent during World War I, but analysis is complicated by 
price and wage fluctuations during this period. Leaving aside this period, the Gini coefficient in the 
four decades from the 1890s to the end of the 1930s was measured in the range of 0.60 plus or minus 
0.05.  Second, the decline during World War II was swift and extensive. Third, the post-1989 reversal 
took the Gini from around 0.40 to over 0.45 in two decades. We turn now to consider the individual 
sub-periods in more detail. 
 
Taken as a whole, the period from 1875 to 1939 shows unchanged overall inequality and affluence, 
whereas the upper tail Gini decreased by 5 percentage points. The different evolution of upper tail 
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inequality and overall inequality (and affluence) corresponds to a significant decrease in the ratio 
between the mean incomes of the lower and upper halves of the population (see Figure A8 and Table 
A8). The increase in the Gini coefficient from 0.55 in 1875 to 0,64 in 1892 reflects an increase of the 
share of total income accruing to the highest income group. The growth rates were low during this 
period, and emigration to North America increased sharply from 1880. This was followed by high 
economic growth in the 1890s, which ended in the so-called "Kristiania crash" in 1899 leading to 
substantial drops in property values and stagnation for several years. In particular, there appears to 
have been a downward tendency in overall inequality from the late-1890s to around 1905, followed by 
remarkable stability from 1905 to 1914.  The most dramatic short-run event occured during the First 
World War, where we observe the highest Gini coefficient of 0.65 and the smallest mean income ratio 
between the lower and upper half of the population occurred in 1917, when the mean income of the 
lower half was only 8.9 per cent of that of the upper half. The low mean income ratio for this period 
reflects the significant income growth for ship owners and the high speculative profits for wealthy 
people during a significant economic boom, which was followed by a recession with high inflation, 
trade deficits and currency depreciation and hardships such as rationing that affected wage earners. As 
a result, the income of the rich declined and the mean income ratio doubled from 1917 to 1923. 
However, inequality quickly returned to its pre-war level in the early 1920s and increased slightly 
during the 1930s. 
 
The simultaneous substantial growth of the mean income ratio and decline of the upper tail Gini 
coefficient led to a substantial fall in the overall Gini coefficient from 1939 to 1953. Since the mean 
income ratio stayed fairly flat at around 1/4 since the early 1950s, the rise in overall inequality and 
affluence after the turning point in 1980 was largely due to rising upper tail inequality. This means that 
the richest became richer, as is also confirmed by the rising top income shares during this period. The 
concentration in time of the sharp decrease in the Gini coefficient between 1939 and 1953 is likely a 
combination of several factors. First,  the manner of operation of labor market institutions changed 
significantly during the 1930s, where collective bargaining was introduced at the national level. 
Economic turbulence may have postponed the immediate effects of these reforms. Second, more than 
40 per cent of  the work force was still in agriculture in the 1930s, and rural-urban migration (and 
hence income equalization) was again constrained by high unemployment. Moreover, the Second 
World War was likely to have had an equalizing effect in itself, with more controls imposed on the 
economy where the German occupation led to increased labor demand for extensive construction 
projects and larger mean income for the bottom half of the population which resulted in increased 
mean income ratio. Moreover, the German command economy reduced the income opportunities of 
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most capital owners, which might explain why the upper tail Gini coefficient sharply declined. The 
war experience might also have made Norwegians more receptive to the strict economic planning 
regime that was introduced during the early post-war period (Espeli, 2013).   
 
Other sources support the finding of a significant fall in income inequality during this period. For 
example, the 1950 Wage statistics (NOS XI 092, p. 11, table A) compares wages for various 
occupations in 1939 and 1950. While high-paid groups such as senior public servants had experienced 
nominal wage growth of 69 per cent, the wage growth for sailors was 214 per cent, for forestry 
workers 264 per cent and for farm workers (servants) 380 per cent. For the lower-income groups wage 
data are also available for 1944; they show that wage compression was well underway during the war. 
 
We observe a stable income Gini coefficient from 1950 onwards, with a further slight decrease in the 
early 1970s. The fall in income inequality was reversed in the early 1980s.  The turning point was 
largely due to increased wage inequality and came shortly after oil began to flow from the North Sea 
(Aaberge and Mogstad, 2011). By 1990 production had been at a high level for a number of years. The 
1990s show a recovery of the shares of top incomes, probably as a result of expanded opportunities to 
earn and lose money created by the oil sector, a major financial market reform in the mid-1980s, and 
the 1992 tax reform whereby taxes on capital incomes were significantly reduced. On top of that, a tax 
reform where taxes on capital incomes were significantly reduced was implemented in 1993. Over the 
period from 1980 to 2017, the Gini coefficient increased by approximately 20 per cent. The spike in 
income inequality in 2005 is largely due to the increased taxes on dividends in 2006. This tax reform 
gave owner-managers of closely held firms strong insentives to increase dividends in 2005. The 
effects of the reform discussed in further detail by Aaberge, Atkinson and Modalsli (2016) and 
Alstadsæter et al. (2016) suggest that the level of inequality might have been larger after dividend 





Table 1. Changes in overall inequality, upper tail inequality, ratio of the mean income of the 
lower and upper 50 per cent and affluence (changes in percentage points in parentheses) 
Period Overall Gini 
coefficient 
Gini-based affluence Upper tail Gini 
coefficient 
Mean income ratio  
L U  =  
1875 - 1892 Increase (+9) Increase (+9) Slight increase (+1) Decrease (-11)  
1892 - 1914 Decrease (-8) Decrease (-9) Decrease (-8) Increase (+6)  
1914 - 1917 Increase (+9) Increase (+9) Increase (+4) Decrease (-8)  
1917 - 1923 Decrease (-10) Decrease (-10) Decrease (-6) Increase (+9)  
1923 - 1939 Increase (+5) Increase (+5) Increase (+5) Slight decrease (-4)  
1939 - 1953 Decrease (-17) Decrease (-20) Decrease (-24) Increase (+11)  
1953 - 1980 Slight decrease (-2) Slight decrease (-2) Slight decrease (-2) Slight increase (+3)  
1980 - 2017 Increase (+7) Increase (+10) Increase (+14) Slight decrease (-4)  
Note: The components are estimated by using the estimated overall means jointly with the same estimated Lorenz curves as 
were used for estimating the Gini coefficients in Figure 3. Changes are calculated on the basis of the average of upper and 
lower bound estimates. For sources, methods and assumptions, we refer to the text. 
 
To get some sense of the magnitude of the changes in the Gini coefficient, note that the 22 percentage 
points fall in the Gini coefficient from 1892 to 1953 (see Table A8) corresponds to a 34 per cent 
decrease in the Gini coefficient. This corresponds to the redistributive effect of the following 
hypothetical tax/transfer intervention in 1892 (see Aaberge, 1997): introduce a flat tax with tax rate 34 
per cent and allocate the collected tax as a fixed lump-sum transfer equal to the average tax of NOK 
178. Then the 50 per cent poorest increase their income on average from NOK 104 to NOK 247, while 
the 50 per cent richest will get their mean income reduced from NOK 944 to NOK 801. Moreover, this 
hypothetical intervention would change the income of the poor from NOK 85 to NOK 234 and the 95 
per cent quantile from NOK 1630 to NOK 1254.  
6. Summary  
While data on top income shares provide valuable information on the concentration of economic 
power, this paper demonstrates that available historic data souces make it feasible to examine the 
evolution of the income distribution as a whole over long time periods. By combining detailed 
tabulations with aggregate information on the incomes of municipal and central government taxpayers, 
as well as administrative data on poverty support, we are able to provide an estimate of the income 
distribution in 1875 and annually from 1892 to 1951. This is then supplemented with detailed tax 
tabulations and micro data from 1952 onwards in order to provide income distributions through to the 
most recently available data for 2017. From these income distributions we can then estimate Gini 
coefficients, as well as other relevant measures of income inequality and affluence, for consistent 
definitions of population and income throughout the entire period in question. The proposed method is 
likely also to be of relevance for other countries. 
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The empirical results provide three novel insights into the long-run evolution of income inequality in 
Norway. First, our findings suggest that at the end of the nineteenth century, the Gini coefficient for 
gross family income in Norway varied between 0.50 and 0.60. Such an apparently Latin American 
value casts some doubt on the claim made in the official publication for the Paris Exhibition of 1900 
that “among civilised states, there is scarcely any that is so fortunate with regard to the equality of its 
social conditions as Norway.  There is no nobility with political or economic privilege, no large 
estates, no capitalist class” (Norway, 1900, page 203). While Norway has exhibited low inequality 
from the 1940s till 1990s, we find no indication that this represents a continuation of an earlier 
egalitarian society.  
 
Second, the movement of income inequality over time appears to be driven by episodic changes rather 
than predictable, secular cycles. Overall gross income inequality among families in Norway fell from 
1892 to 1914, largely due to a fall in inequality in the upper half of the income distribution.  There was 
an upward spike during World War I, and a moderate rise between 1923 and 1939, again largely due 
to changes in inequality in the upper half. Inequality fell substantially between 1939 and 1953 as a 
result of a decline in both upper tail inequality and the gap between upper and lower tail means. 
Income inequality was low and stable between 1953 and 1980 and has risen again since 1980.  
 
Expressed in this way, the history of Norwegian income inequality is better seen as a series of 
episodes than as the expression of some long-run pattern. It can neither be summarized by an inverse 
U nor by a U.  Moreover, the series of 143 years of income inequality estimates does neither point in 
the direction of any regular cycles of increasing and decreasing inequality.  
 
Third, it should be noted that the turning point and the origin of the low post-war inequality in Norway 
was the significant decline in inequality starting in 1940 and continuing during the German 
occupation. The war experience might also have made Norwegians more receptive to the strict 
economic planning regime that was introduced in the early post-war period (Espeli, 2013).   
 
A comparison of the levels of income inequality in Norway with previous estimates for other countries 
is challenging for several reasons: No countries have complete micro data far back in time; there is no 
universally agreed definition of population or income (as these in turn are dependent on the available 
data); and there are often breaks even within series for comparable countries. Despite the break in the 
series for Denmark provided by Atkinson and Søgaard (based on tabulations from income taxes) these 
series makes an exception and shows, as for Norway, increased income inequality during World War I 
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and a substantial decrease in income inequality during the mid-20th century. The turning point with 
increasing income inequality arose in the early 1980s for both countries, but inequality has risen more 
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Appendix A: Robustness checks  
Sensitivity of estimates to the use of additional data sources  
Figure A1 shows how sensitive the estimated Gini coefficients in the 1892-1951 period are to the 
inclusion of additional sources of data and methodological assumptions. The lowest curve in each 
panel, G1, displays estimates of the Gini coefficent when the population is defined by taxpayers 
(MUN and CG) and only one interior point of the Lorenz curve has been identified. This gives a Gini 
coefficient of around 0.4 before 1939 and less than 0.2 in 1950. By including non-taxpayers and 
assigning them zero income, we get G2, which shows that the Gini coefficient rose to 0.65 in 1892 and 
0.3 in 1950. The G3 curve is obtained by assigning an income to the non-taxpaying population 
according to the procedure described in Section 3. As a transition from the distribution underlying G2 
to the distribution underlying G3 could be obtained (with the appropriate scaling of mean incomes) by 
means of regressive transfers, G3 is always lower than G2.   By taking account of within-group 
inequality in the richest group, i.e. the CG taxpayers, we get the G4 curve. For years where detailed 
CG tax tabulations are not available, the closest available earlier or later distribution has been used 
(the higher one for the upper bound and the lower for the lower bound). Finally, in G5, we also allow 
for inequality within the group of those who pay municipal tax but not central government tax. This 
increases inequality moderately, and more so in years when this group is large. It is evident from this 
exercise that the steps we propose in Section 3 are crucial for a correct estimation of income 
inequality, though the assumptions on within-group inequality in some groups have only a minor 
effect on the estimates. 
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Figure A1. Estimates of the bounds of the Gini coefficients using five different sets of assump-
tions, 1892-1951 
 
Note: Definitions: G1:Inequality among taxpayers, no within-group dispersion. G2: Assuming zero income for non-
taxpayers. G3: Baseline assumption about non-taxpayer income. G4: Within-group dispersion for CG taxpayers (using 
nearest year). G5: Within-group dispersion for MUN-CG taxpayers (our preferred estimate, as presented in Figure 3). 
Sensitivity to choice of inequality measure   
To complement the information on inequality provided by the Gini coefficient, we employ two closely 
related rank-dependent measures of inequality ( 1C  and 3C ) discussed by Aaberge (2007) and defined 
by 
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and   and 
1( )F u−  denote the mean and the left inverse of F . As demonstrated by Aaberge (2007) 
the measures 1C , 2C  and 3C , denoted Gini’s Nuclear Family, jointly provide a good summary of the 
information provided by the Lorenz curve. Whilst it can be shown that the Gini coefficient (
2C ) tends 
to pay most attention to changes that occur in the middle part of a typical single peaked income 
distribution, the two other members of Gini’s Nuclear Family are shown to be particularly sensitive to 
changes that occur in the lower part ( 1C ) and the upper part ( 3C ) of the income distribution.  
 
Note that the ratio of the second term of (A1) can be interpreted as the ratio between the social welfare 
attained under the observed distribution F and that attained under complete equality.  As a contribution 
to the interpretation of the inequality aversion profiles exhibited by 1C  , 2C and 3C , Table A1 
displays ratios of the weights – as defined by (A2) – given to the median individual and the 5 per cent 
poorest, the 30 per cent poorest and the 5 per cent richest individuals, respectively. 
Table A1: Distributional weight profiles of the inequality measures 1C  , 2C and 3C  
Relative weights 
1C  (Bonferroni) 2C  (Gini) 3C  
p(.05)/p(.5) 4.32 1.90 1.33 
p(.30)/p(.5) 1.74 1.40 1.21 
p(.95)/p(.5) 0.07 0.10 0.13 
 
As suggested by the table above, 1C  is more sensitive than 2C  to changes in the income distribution 
that concern the poor, whereas 
2C  is more sensitive than 3C  to changes that occur in the lower part of 
the income distribution. For example, the weights in Table A1 demonstrate that the weight of an 
additional euro to a person located at the 5 per cent decile is 4.3 times the weight for the median income 
earner when 1C  is used as a measure of inequality, whereas it is only 1.3 times the weight for the median 
earner when 3C is used as a measure of inequality. This means that 1C  is particularly sensitive to 
changes that take place in the lower part of the income distribution, and 3C  to changes in the upper part 
of the income distribution.  
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Figure A2. Long-run evolution of income inequality described by three alternative measures of 
income inequality, Norway 1875 - 2017 
 
Note: The components are estimated using the same distribution as the one used for estimating the Gini coefficients in Figure 
3. The graphs display the mean of the upper and lower bound estimates. For sources, methods and assumptions, see text. 
 
The results displayed in Figure A2 show that the evolution of the Gini coefficient is largely reflected 
by the inequality measures that are particularly sensitive to changes in the lower and upper part of the 
income distribution, respectively. However, the magnitudes of the changes differ significantly for 
some periods. From 1939 to 1980, the 1C − coefficient decreased by 20 per cent, the Gini coefficient 
by 33 per cent and the 3C − coefficient by 40 per cent, whereas the percentage changes were almost 
equal from 1875 to 1939. From 1980 to 2017 1 2 3,C C and C rose by 7, 20 and 27 per cent, 
respectively. These results, which are in line with the evidence provided by Section 4.3, show that 




Appendix B: Sources of Norwegian tax data 
Sources of tabulated income tax data  
The two income tax sources form the basis for the tabulation of taxpayers by income ranges from 1948 
to 1966, which precede the micro-data available from 1967. As noted in the text, the number paying 
MUN tax exceeds that paying CG tax. In the tabulations (HS 1978, Table 314), income is equal to 
assessed income according to the central government tax assessment for the years 1948-51 and 
assessed income according to municipal tax assessment for the years 1952-55. This accounts for the 
jump in the number of taxpayers and amount of assessed income in 1952, from 947,842 CG taxpayers 
in 1951 to 1,412,873 MUN taxpayers in 1952 (an increase of 49 per cent), and from NOK 7,993 
million to NOK 10,227 million in 1952 (an increase of 28 per cent). The smaller percentage increase 
in total income reflects the fact that those paying MUN but not CG the MUN-CG group), have lower 
average incomes. In the tabulations for the years 1957 to 1966, income is defined as assessed income 
according to the central government tax assessment if central government tax is levied. If not, income 
is defined as assessed income according to the municipal tax assessment.  
The sources for pre-1948 years are listed in Table A2.  
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Table A2: Sources of tabulated income data  
Year Source Taxpayer 
categories 
Number of taxpayers Number 
of groups 
1875 Skattelikningen 1876 (A.N. Kiær - 1892-93, pp. 110-
113, included tax free incomes and Ot.Prp. no. 11 for 
1881 pp. 20-25 
MUN 705 460 33 
1888 St. Porp. Nr. 48. (1890), ppages 42 and 122 MUN 472 104 9 
1892 Ot. Prop. No. 39 CG 176 142 8 
1893 St. Prop. No 91 CG 102 542 6 
1894 St. Prop. No. 112 CG 66 807 5 
1895 St. Prop. No. 104 CG 68 233 14 
1896 St. Prop. No. 89 CG 70 454 14 
1897 Statsskattens fordeling 1892/93-1898/99 CG 75 578 14 
1898 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 94 587 15 
1899 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 91 422 14 
1900 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 94 367 14 
1901 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 95 767 14 
1902 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 97 517 14 
1903 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 96 431 14 
1906 Rygg, 1910, pages 50 and 69  677 487 17 
1913 NOS VI.57, page 30*  774 308 12 
1938 Stat Medd 1941, nos 11 and 12, page 333  410 020  
26 
1948-1951 HS1978, Table 314, page 572-573 CG Lowest: 954 524  
Highest: 1 047 017 
25 
1952-1955 HS1978, Table 314, page 572-573 MUN Lowest: 1 396 738  
Highest: 1 439 770 
25 
1957-1966 HS1978, Table 314, page 572-573 MUN and CG Lowest: 1 372 298  
Highest: 1 543 022 
25 




Sources of aggregate statistics on taxpayers and the poor  
The source of the aggregate numbers of taxpayers and total assessed income (before the adjustment 
from all taxpayers to personal taxpayers) is displayed in Table A3. 
Table A3. Sources of data on municipal and central government taxpayers 
Years Municipal tax aggregates Central government tax aggregates 
1875 and 1888 See Appendix B (Detailed sources) Not applicable 
1892-1899 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1902, Table 99 
1900 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1906, Table 104 
1901 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1907, Table 104 
1902 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1908, Table 108 
1903-1908 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1909, Table 108 
1909-1914 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1915, Table 112A 
1915-1916 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1918, Table 124 
1917-1919 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1920, Table 143a 
1920 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1921, Table 160 
1921 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1924, Table 179 
1922-1923 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1926/1927, Table 178 
1924-1926 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1929, Table 199 
1927-1936 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1940, Table 267 
1937-1945 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 NOS Tax Statistics * 
1946-1953 Historical Statistics 1958, Table 200 NOS Tax Statistics * 
* NOS tax statistics are annual publications; numbers for year t  are reported  
in the publication with the title "t+1/t+2" i.e. "NOS tax statistics for the fiscal year  
1938/39" have data for 1937 and so on. 
 
One problem in using these statistics is to restrict the coverage to personal taxpayers by excluding 
non-personal taxpayers, a group that “comprises joint-stock companies, co-operative societies and 
other corporations” (HS 1968, page 428). This applies to the tax data between 1921 and 1947 (from 
1948 onwards we have separate reports on personal taxpayers and total taxpayers). For most years 
between 1937 and 1947, we have separate reports of the totals and interpolate the missing years using 
the ratio between personal and all taxpayers. There is little year-to-year variation in this ratio. For this 
reason, we use the 1937 ratio to impute the share of personal taxpayers (and their income) for the 
period 1921-1936. For municipal taxpayers, this amounts to multiplying the total number of taxpayers 
by 0.937 and total income by 0.855.  For central government taxpayers, the corresponding numbers 
are 0.973 and 0.848. 
 
Data on the number of supported poor and total poverty support 1875-1951 are obtained from the 
annually published poverty statistics. An overview of data for every fifth year is found in Historical 
Statistics 1994, Table 7.8.  
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Appendix C: Controls for total tax units and total income 
Control totals: adults and tax units 
The adult population is defined as those aged 16 and over. The data from 1948 onwards were supplied 
by Statistics Norway. Pre-1948 data on the population by age are available from Historical Statistics 
1994, Table 3.5, for 5 year intervals. We took the data for 31 December of year (t-1) as applying to 
year t, so that the data cover years ending in 1 or 6. From these, we calculated the proportion of the 
population aged 16 and over, and interpolated linearly for the intervening years.  The percentages were 
then applied to the mean annual population figures given in Historical Statistics 1978, Table 9.   
 
Total tax units are obtained by subtracting the number of married women.  The numbers of married 
women are given at 5 year intervals in Historical Statistics 1994, Table 3.7. They are expressed as 
percentages of the adult population and the percentages linearly interpolated. The results are shown in 
Table A5. 
Control totals: household income 
The starting point for total income is a series for total household income as measured in the national 
accounts for 1978 to 2006 provided by Statistics Norway. Total household income is made up of (i) 
compensation of employees (not including employers’ social security contributions), (ii) operating 
surplus of self-employed businesses, (iii) property income, (iv) transfers from government and from 
abroad, and (v) income not elsewhere classified.  In order to extrapolate this series backwards, we 
have made use of series that are as comparable as possible, given the available material from HS 1994 
and earlier editions. In each case, the series have been linked at years where the estimates seem most 
comparable (for this reason we have started with 1979, rather than 1978). If the 1979 value from the 
Statistics Norway series is A1979, and the first linked series is for 1975 to 1979, given by B1975, …, 
B1979, then for 1978 we take the value of B1978 multiplied by A1979/B1979.   
 
Working backwards to 1950, we have used the Nasjonalregnskap 1968-1979, Table 33, pages 138-139 
for the New Definition of Private Income for 1968 to 1978. For 1950 to 1968, we have used the Old 
Definition of Private Income from Historisk statistikk 1978 (Statistics Norway, 1978), Table 59 (page 
104) for 1965 to 1968 and from Historisk statistikk 1968, Table 70 (pages 110-111) for 1950 to 1964.   
In each case employers’ social security contributions were subtracted from the total of private income; 
these were taken from Nasjonalregnskap 1969-1980, Table 30 (for 1969 to 1974), Nasjonalregnskap 
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1962-1978, Table 29 (for 1962 to 1968), Nasjonalregnskap 1953-1969, Table 14 (for 1953 to 1961), 
and Nasjonalregnskap 1968-1979, Table 14 (for 1950 to 1952).  
 
For years prior to 1950, we use for 1930 to 1950 Nasjonalregnskap 1865-1960 (NOS XII 163), Table 
24, adding Direct taxes paid to Private disposable income.  This source does not give figures for 1940 
to 1945, and we have interpolated for 1940 to 1943 using the net real income figure in Table 35 of 
Statistiske oversikter 1948 (NOS X 178). No figures are given for 1944 and 1945. For years prior to 
1930, the main source is Langtidslinjer i Norsk Økonomi 1865-1960, Table VIII, where we have taken 
the sum of Private income from labour and capital and Transfers from government and Transfers from 
abroad. This source provides annual estimates from 1865 to 1900. For the period 1900 to 1930, the 
estimates are given at 5 yearly intervals. The figures for intermediate years have been interpolated 
using the series for “private gross income” from Nasjonalregnskap 1900-1929 (NOS XI 143), Table 7.  
 
Figure A3. Internal total as a share of control total 
 
Note: The figure shows the internal total (total income calculated from tax statistics) relative to the control total 
calculated from (reconstructed) national accounts. Source: National accounts (control total) and calculations 





Figure A4 shows control totals for income and population, as discussed in Section 2.2.   
 
If we subtract the income totals for taxpayers, non-assisted/non-taxed and poor from the control total, 
we get an "excess income" that in our method is allocated to taxpayers, as discussed in Section 3. We 
can compare this excess to the control total to get an idea of its magnitude. This ratio is between 0.10 
and 0.27 in all years 1875-1951, with the exception of the years between 1915 and 1920 when it is 
lower and 1945 when it is higher (0.32).  
 
Figure A4. Control totals for income and population 
 
Note: The left panel shows the total population (age 16 and over, married couples counted as one unit) from 
population statistics and the total number of units in the tax statistics. The right panel shows the total income 
from tax statistics, as well as the total income obtained using the assumptions explained in Section 3, as well as 




Appendix D: Within-group distributions 
The Gini coefficients discussed in the main paper are not dependent on assumptions on within-group 
inequality per se. Rather, they can be construed (in the years where there are no data on within-group 
dispersion) as interpolations based on within-group Gini coefficients. However, in some cases it is 
desirable to draw Lorenz curves for illustrative purposes or to estimate other inequality measures 
beside the Gini coefficient. In these cases, the following within-group distributions are one example of 
function forms that are consistent with the within-group Gini coefficients. Moreover, the calculations 
here verify that the within-group Gini coefficients are consistent across groups: i.e., that the lowest-
income individuals in the higher groups do not have lower incomes than the highest-income 
individuals in poorer groups. 
CG group (highest incomes) 







with mean income 
𝛼𝑑
𝛼−1
 and lower bound d. We set the parameter d to make the mean correspond to the 














Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) provide values of the Pareto coefficient 𝛼 for the relevant periods 





For the individuals who pay municipal tax but not state tax, we use a uniform distribution with 





, 𝑦 ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏] 
 
with mean income 𝜇 = (𝑎 + 𝑏)/2, lower bound a and upper bound b.  
 
The Lorenz curve for a uniformly distributed population is  
 
𝐿(𝐹) =  
1
𝑎 + 𝑏
((𝑏 − 𝑎)𝐹2 + 2𝑎𝐹) 
 
and the corresponding Gini coefficient is 
 










For our purposes, it is convenient to rephrase the uniform distribution using the mean m and a spread 
parameter z giving the relative distance of the lower and upper bounds from the mean:  𝑎 = (1 − 𝑧)𝜇 
and 𝑏 = (1 + 𝑧)𝜇. This gives a Gini coefficient of 3G z
 = . 
 
To respect the assumption that the highest-income individual in the MUN-CG group should not have 
higher income than the lowest-income individual in the CG group, 𝑏𝑀𝑈𝑁−𝐶𝐺 must be lower than or 
equal to 𝑑. Using the known means and inserting for the above equations, we get 
 







An illustration of the Lorenz curve using Pareto distributions 
Figure A5 illustrates the general point that Lorenz curves of left-skewed income distributions lean 
heavily to the right. The two Lorenz curves are plotted for Pareto distributions with shape parameters 
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1.5 =  (left panel and 2 =  (right panel, which correspond to Gini equal to 0.500 and 0.333). It is 
evident from Figure A5 that there is clearly larger potential for within-group inequality for the half of 
the population above the median than for the half below the median.  
 
Figure A5. Illustration of Lorenz curves for Pareto distributions with shape parameter 1.5 =  





Appendix E: Adjustments to tabulated data 1952 to 1966 
From 1952 to 1966, the income distributions used in this paper are obtained from detailed tables in 
Historical Statistics 1978 (HS1978). (There are also tables for 1948-1951 on the same pages, but these 
are CG taxpayers only and hence cover a lower share of the population. They are used to calculate G* 
for these years in the 4-class tables). Some adjustments to these data are required to make the time 
series consistent with the period up until 1951 and the micro data from 1967 onwards.  
Adjustment for sailor taxation 
A separate sailor tax, based on a law from 1947, was introduced in 1948.  Sailors are not included in 
the HS1978 detailed tables. We add sailors to these tables. From 1956 onward we have the number of 
sailors and their mean income from HS1978 Table 308. Before 1956, we use the tax statistics, or 
HS1978 Table 307, which shows total sailor taxes paid, and deduce the numbers from that. We use a 
uniform distribution on (0, 2*sailor mean inc) for sailor incomes and add these to the tables for 1951-
1966. 
 
To apply the changes, the tabular data are re-grouped into 100 percentiles with mean incomes and 
population sizes. The same is done for the sailors; the tables are then added. For the spouses, a 
transformation algorithm based on registry data from 1967 is applied whereby spouses are observed 
individually, as well as a variable informing us whether they chose to be taxed separately or not. This 
is described in detail in the next paragraph. 
Treatment of married couples 
Up until 1960, married women are always taxed with their husbands. From 1960, married couples 
could elect to be taxed separately. They are then included as two separate individuals in the 
tabulations. In the registry data (available from 1967) we can identify, on the individual level, which 
individuals were taxed separately. Hence, we can construct tabulation of units both by taxation status 
(as in HS1978) and by couples jointly (our preferred population, and the one used in tabulations before 
1960). In this section we describe how we use information from the registry data to construct a 
conversion algorithm that we apply to the 1960-1966 tabulations, and in this way increase the 
comparability of the data. 
 
In the 1967 income file, we observe 115,753 couples that are definitelytaxed separately. These are 
mainly couples where both have high incomes, as shown in Figure A6, which gives the share of 
couples that are taxed separately by wife's and husband's incomes. The darker shade denotes that more 
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than 80% with this income combination are taxed separately, while the lighter shade denotes less than 
20%. White means that there are few individuals with this income combination. 
Figure A6. Percentage of couples taxed separately in Norway, by husband and wife's income, 
1967 
 
Note: The figure shows the incidence of joint taxation, by husbands' and wives' incomes in 1967 (when joint 
taxation was optional). Source: Individual-level income data from Statistics Norway. For details, see text. 
 
In 1960, we have no registry data on incomes, but the Census of 1960 has information on the "main 
source of livelihood" for individuals and is available in registry form. The variable "main source of 
livelihood" has three possible values: 
1. Income from own work 
2. Pensions / transfers / income from wealth / loan / scholarships etc 
3. Income from someone else's work (supported) 
 
Most married women are in category 3, while most married men are in category 1 (all combinations 
exist). There are around 45 000 married couples where both husband and wife are in category 1. 
Hence, we assume that 45 000 couples were taxed separately in 1960. This corresponds well with the 
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increase in the number of units in the tax statistics of 67 509 (from 1 372 298 to 1 439 807) from 1959 
to 1960, allowing for some growth in the general population in addition to the results of the tax law 
change. In the absence of more data, we use a linear interpolation for the numbers of those who were 
separately taxed between 1960 and 1967.  
 
The approach adopted to transform the data from 1960 to 1966 is as follows: 
• Construct a file of the 1967 population that corresponds to the tabular definitions from 
1960 onwards. That is, merge married couples into one unit with income = (husband's 
income + wife's income) only if they are jointly taxed. If they are separately taxed, 
keep them as two units. Separate taxation usually takes place if both spouses have 
non-neglible incomes. In the file, each unit can be either 
o An unmarried (or widowed, etc) man 
o An unmarried (or widowed, etc) woman 
o A married couple with joint taxation (where at least one spouse is marked as 
not filing separately) 
o A married man with separate filing (whose wife also files separately) 
o A married woman with separate filing (whose husband also files separately) 
• Divide this population into 100 percentiles, sorted by income. 
• For each percentile, calculate 
o The share of units that is a married man with separate filing 
o The share of units that is a married woman with separate filing 
o Among units that are married men with separate filings, the income share of 
the husband in the marriage (ie (income of husband / (income of husband+in-
come of wife)) 
 






Figure A7. Prevalence of separate taxation in 1967, by income percentile 
 
Note: The figure shows the incidence of joint taxation, by household income, in 1967 (when joint taxation was 
optional). Source: Individual-level income data from Statistics Norway. For details, see text. 
 
We now apply the transformation to each  of the years 1960 to 1966 (year t) as follows: 
• Adjust the "is husband" and "is wife" probabilities down by the factor (number of sep-
arately taxed couples in t)/(number of separately taxed couples in 1967) 
• Divide the tabular population of year t into 100 percentiles, sorted by income. (Many 
of the percentiles will have equal incomes, as the tables have less than 100 categories. 
This is not a problem.) 
• Divide each percentile group with a given mean income y and population N into three 
groups: 
o Separately taxed husbands: N* (probabilitiy of being separately taxed hus-
band). We return to this group below 
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o Separately taxed wives: N* (probability of being separately taxed wife). We 
delete these observations as we want to consider them together with their hus-
bands 
o The remaining population N* (the sum of the two above probabilities) consists 
of either single individuals or jointly taxed couples and is left as is. 
• Divide the income of the separately taxed husbands by the mean share of separately 
taxed husbands in the percentile. As we divide by a number between 0 and 1, these in-
comes are inflated. This step converts the separately taxed husbands’ incomes into 
couples' incomes. 
• Finally, re-group the observations into 100 percentiles again. We will now have a 
smaller population as we have created "pseudo-couples" that closely resemble couples 
in the underlying population. 
 
For 1967, the procedure gives near-perfect results. For earlier years, we cannot test the procedure 
directly. However, the sums of the imputed incomes are very close to the sums of original incomes 
(largest difference is 0.6 %), which is a sign that the interpolation is relativelyaccurate. 
Adjustments for years before 1892  
Some special adjustments have been made for the pre- 1892 period, as no state tax was collected in 
this period. We do have the total number of poor and their total support, from which we obtain the 
mean income of the poor. For the NA/NT group, we use the income of the poor (NOK 85 in 1875 and 
NOK 76 in 1888) for the upper bound Gini and NOK 150 as the lower bound Gini.  We take the 
lowest income group in the tabulations, which contains 74 per cent of tabulated individuals in 1875 
and 86 per cent of tabulated individuals in 1888, and treat these similarly to the MUN-CG groups in 
1892 and thereafter. The remaining 26 and 14 per cent are treated similarly to the CG groups in later 
years, and the G* figures for these years are estimated on this population, with incomes above NOK 





Appendix F: Estmates of the Gini coefficient and other key  
variables for Norway 1875-2017  
Five tables are shown below: 
• Overall Gini coefficient and other measures of income dispersion (Table A4) 
• Income and population totals for the four groups before 1951 (Table A5) and popula-
tion and income totals after 1951 (Table A6) 
• Parameters used for calculating the "four-group" Gini coefficient (Table A7) 
• Alternative measures of income dispersion (Table A8) 
The information is also available as an online Appendix in Excel format (on request). 





Table A4. Upper and lower bounds of overall Gini coefficient, upper tail Gini coefficient, 
ratio of upper tail mean income and overall mean income and affluence, Norway 1875-
2017  















median) Affluence  
1875 0.556 1.651 0.508 0.496 0.540 1.651 0.508 0.496 
1888 0.641 1.828 0.489 0.574 0.569 1.763 0.489 0.542 
1892 0.643 1.807 0.515 0.580 0.637 1.796 0.515 0.574 
1893 0.631 1.801 0.491 0.562 0.607 1.761 0.491 0.542 
1894 0.610 1.785 0.461 0.536 0.576 1.729 0.461 0.509 
1895 0.602 1.770 0.462 0.530 0.573 1.724 0.462 0.507 
1896 0.600 1.770 0.454 0.525 0.568 1.718 0.454 0.500 
1897 0.601 1.765 0.460 0.525 0.570 1.716 0.460 0.501 
1898 0.602 1.760 0.467 0.527 0.574 1.716 0.467 0.506 
1899 0.606 1.764 0.469 0.530 0.577 1.720 0.469 0.508 
1900 0.597 1.751 0.469 0.524 0.575 1.716 0.469 0.507 
1901 0.585 1.736 0.459 0.511 0.564 1.703 0.459 0.495 
1902 0.579 1.728 0.454 0.504 0.558 1.696 0.454 0.489 
1903 0.578 1.729 0.451 0.503 0.557 1.696 0.451 0.487 
1904 0.569 1.717 0.445 0.494 0.549 1.686 0.444 0.478 
1905 0.565 1.707 0.450 0.492 0.550 1.686 0.449 0.481 
1906 0.573 1.717 0.453 0.498 0.559 1.694 0.453 0.487 
1907 0.579 1.721 0.458 0.504 0.559 1.699 0.446 0.486 
1908 0.574 1.710 0.461 0.500 0.556 1.693 0.447 0.483 
1909 0.578 1.714 0.466 0.504 0.559 1.695 0.451 0.486 
1910 0.580 1.716 0.469 0.507 0.564 1.703 0.452 0.491 
1911 0.580 1.713 0.470 0.506 0.563 1.698 0.452 0.489 
1912 0.572 1.698 0.471 0.499 0.549 1.686 0.439 0.475 
1913 0.572 1.712 0.457 0.498 0.567 1.704 0.457 0.495 
1914 0.568 1.708 0.450 0.493 0.550 1.699 0.426 0.474 
1915 0.606 1.754 0.480 0.532 0.588 1.748 0.449 0.511 
1916 0.637 1.814 0.479 0.561 0.614 1.809 0.437 0.533 
1917 0.655 1.836 0.498 0.583 0.635 1.836 0.454 0.557 
1918 0.604 1.779 0.452 0.528 0.584 1.779 0.407 0.501 
1919 0.586 1.792 0.401 0.504 0.560 1.792 0.343 0.469 
1920 0.572 1.749 0.417 0.493 0.549 1.749 0.366 0.463 
1921 0.567 1.729 0.439 0.496 0.549 1.729 0.397 0.472 
1922 0.551 1.704 0.433 0.481 0.535 1.704 0.395 0.459 
1923 0.552 1.703 0.435 0.481 0.536 1.703 0.399 0.461 
1924 0.573 1.726 0.453 0.503 0.558 1.726 0.417 0.482 
1925 0.576 1.729 0.459 0.507 0.560 1.729 0.423 0.487 
1926 0.561 1.701 0.471 0.501 0.549 1.701 0.441 0.484 
1927 0.547 1.679 0.472 0.490 0.536 1.679 0.446 0.476 
1928 0.551 1.679 0.484 0.497 0.541 1.679 0.459 0.483 
1929 0.569 1.700 0.493 0.513 0.558 1.700 0.468 0.499 
1930 0.577 1.709 0.499 0.521 0.567 1.709 0.474 0.506 
1931 0.578 1.706 0.503 0.521 0.569 1.706 0.482 0.509 
1932 0.578 1.709 0.498 0.520 0.569 1.709 0.477 0.508 
1933 0.578 1.710 0.497 0.520 0.569 1.710 0.476 0.508 
1934 0.581 1.717 0.491 0.520 0.571 1.717 0.469 0.507 
1935 0.585 1.722 0.492 0.523 0.575 1.722 0.469 0.510 
1936 0.589 1.728 0.493 0.526 0.578 1.728 0.467 0.512 
1937 0.606 1.751 0.500 0.542 0.593 1.751 0.470 0.525 
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1938 0.585 1.750 0.454 0.515 0.585 1.750 0.454 0.515 
1939 0.597 1.758 0.472 0.530 0.590 1.758 0.457 0.520 
1940 0.577 1.743 0.438 0.502 0.570 1.743 0.422 0.493 
1941 0.548 1.735 0.386 0.469 0.538 1.735 0.364 0.455 
1942 0.518 1.700 0.360 0.437 0.508 1.700 0.336 0.424 
1943 0.532 1.728 0.359 0.450 0.521 1.728 0.333 0.435 
1944 0.529 1.725 0.362 0.449 0.518 1.725 0.336 0.435 
1945 0.532 1.730 0.350 0.445 0.520 1.730 0.324 0.430 
1946 0.502 1.697 0.315 0.410 0.487 1.694 0.284 0.392 
1947 0.498 1.682 0.315 0.404 0.483 1.676 0.284 0.384 
1948 0.496 1.674 0.315 0.400 0.496 1.674 0.315 0.400 
1949 0.468 1.615 0.315 0.375 0.468 1.615 0.315 0.375 
1950 0.464 1.604 0.318 0.372 0.464 1.604 0.318 0.372 
1951 0.446 1.597 0.284 0.350 0.446 1.597 0.284 0.350 
1952 0.440 1.628 0.233 0.336 0.421 1.604 0.233 0.326 
1953 0.429 1.619 0.221 0.326 0.411 1.596 0.221 0.316 
1954 0.431 1.624 0.224 0.329 0.410 1.595 0.224 0.318 
1955 0.433 1.619 0.230 0.330 0.413 1.592 0.230 0.319 
1957 0.446 1.632 0.245 0.344 0.427 1.606 0.245 0.333 
1958 0.446 1.636 0.238 0.342 0.427 1.611 0.238 0.331 
1959 0.445 1.638 0.233 0.340 0.423 1.609 0.233 0.328 
1960 0.438 1.628 0.226 0.332 0.416 1.599 0.226 0.320 
1961 0.441 1.633 0.227 0.334 0.421 1.607 0.227 0.324 
1962 0.440 1.635 0.221 0.332 0.423 1.612 0.221 0.322 
1963 0.445 1.643 0.223 0.336 0.425 1.616 0.223 0.325 
1964 0.436 1.628 0.216 0.327 0.417 1.603 0.216 0.317 
1965 0.439 1.638 0.213 0.329 0.416 1.606 0.213 0.316 
1966 0.437 1.636 0.212 0.328 0.414 1.604 0.212 0.315 
1967 0.453 1.657 0.227 0.344 0.429 1.624 0.227 0.331 
1968 0.447 1.646 0.226 0.339 0.424 1.615 0.226 0.326 
1969 0.442 1.636 0.227 0.336 0.419 1.606 0.227 0.323 
1970 0.441 1.635 0.228 0.336 0.418 1.603 0.228 0.323 
1971 0.439 1.631 0.224 0.332 0.415 1.599 0.224 0.319 
1972 0.437 1.629 0.223 0.331 0.414 1.598 0.223 0.318 
1973 0.437 1.629 0.223 0.331 0.414 1.599 0.223 0.319 
1974 0.436 1.630 0.220 0.329 0.413 1.599 0.220 0.317 
1975 0.440 1.639 0.217 0.331 0.417 1.608 0.217 0.319 
1976 0.433 1.628 0.211 0.324 0.412 1.599 0.211 0.312 
1977 0.425 1.615 0.209 0.317 0.404 1.586 0.209 0.306 
1978 0.419 1.604 0.209 0.313 0.397 1.575 0.209 0.301 
1979 0.414 1.596 0.207 0.309 0.393 1.568 0.207 0.298 
1980 0.406 1.584 0.203 0.302 0.386 1.558 0.203 0.291 
1981 0.406 1.584 0.205 0.303 0.385 1.556 0.205 0.291 
1982 0.408 1.585 0.208 0.305 0.386 1.556 0.208 0.293 
1983 0.413 1.592 0.212 0.310 0.388 1.559 0.212 0.296 
1984 0.415 1.595 0.216 0.313 0.390 1.562 0.216 0.300 
1985 0.416 1.594 0.220 0.315 0.392 1.562 0.220 0.302 
1986 0.417 1.593 0.224 0.316 0.393 1.561 0.224 0.303 
1987 0.419 1.595 0.227 0.319 0.398 1.566 0.227 0.307 
1988 0.418 1.591 0.229 0.318 0.397 1.563 0.229 0.307 
1989 0.410 1.578 0.232 0.314 0.392 1.556 0.232 0.305 
1990 0.415 1.584 0.235 0.319 0.397 1.562 0.235 0.310 
1991 0.420 1.592 0.242 0.326 0.401 1.567 0.242 0.316 
1992 0.437 1.605 0.271 0.346 0.415 1.577 0.271 0.335 
1993 0.450 1.615 0.290 0.361 0.430 1.589 0.290 0.350 
1994 0.453 1.618 0.294 0.364 0.434 1.594 0.294 0.354 
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1995 0.450 1.614 0.293 0.362 0.433 1.592 0.293 0.353 
1996 0.452 1.612 0.297 0.364 0.435 1.592 0.297 0.355 
1997 0.455 1.613 0.303 0.368 0.440 1.595 0.303 0.359 
1998 0.444 1.600 0.296 0.358 0.428 1.580 0.296 0.349 
1999 0.446 1.600 0.301 0.360 0.429 1.579 0.301 0.351 
2000 0.464 1.615 0.325 0.380 0.447 1.594 0.325 0.371 
2001 0.444 1.600 0.296 0.358 0.426 1.577 0.296 0.348 
2002 0.462 1.614 0.323 0.378 0.444 1.591 0.323 0.368 
2003 0.470 1.621 0.334 0.387 0.451 1.597 0.334 0.377 
2004 0.478 1.629 0.343 0.396 0.460 1.605 0.343 0.385 
2005 0.516 1.658 0.397 0.439 0.497 1.635 0.397 0.428 
2006 0.457 1.615 0.308 0.371 0.437 1.590 0.308 0.360 
2007 0.467 1.624 0.322 0.383 0.447 1.599 0.322 0.371 
2008 0.460 1.616 0.317 0.376 0.438 1.588 0.317 0.364 
2009 0.460 1.621 0.312 0.376 0.434 1.588 0.312 0.361 
2010 0.465 1.626 0.319 0.381 0.438 1.591 0.319 0.366 
2011 0.460 1.618 0.317 0.377 0.435 1.586 0.317 0.363 
2012 0.461 1.620 0.317 0.378 0.435 1.587 0.317 0.363 
2013 0.464 1.623 0.320 0.381 0.437 1.589 0.320 0.366 
2014 0.468 1.627 0.325 0.385 0.441 1.591 0.325 0.370 
2015 0.484 1.638 0.349 0.403 0.456 1.603 0.349 0.387 
2016 0.478 1.635 0.340 0.397 0.450 1.598 0.340 0.380 
2017 0.482 1.637 0.345 0.401 0.453 1.601 0.345 0.384 
 
Table A5. Number of individuals and mean incomes, by group, and control totals. Nominal val-
ues in NOK (not CPI-adjusted)  
   Number of individuals Mean income 






















1875 847 000 476 184 053 521 407 83 730 57 810 1 225 230 85 150 85 
1888 919 000 442 65 845 410 098 365 502 77 555 2 537 345 76 150 76 
1892 937 870 490 176 075 342 860 340 254 78 681 1 450 277 85 92 85 
1893 944 840 500 102 542 421 050 340 318 80 930 2 039 338 83 113 83 
1894 955 117 503 66 807 468 322 339 239 80 749 2 709 383 85 128 85 
1895 968 945 514 68 227 476 723 345 533 78 462 2 712 387 93 129 93 
1896 983 818 538 70 454 492 729 340 393 80 242 2 696 397 90 132 90 
1897 999 315 559 75 578 505 845 337 693 80 199 2 700 401 91 134 91 
1898 1 015 808 606 83 933 520 295 331 403 80 177 2 698 408 94 136 94 
1899 1 031 501 639 91 422 521 528 337 821 80 730 2 669 419 95 140 95 
1900 1 045 420 667 94 367 531 711 341 090 78 252 2 683 425 106 142 106 
1901 1 058 452 657 95 767 548 176 332 368 82 141 2 625 427 108 142 108 
1902 1 066 877 652 97 517 556 891 329 077 83 392 2 588 428 108 143 108 
1903 1 071 397 648 96 431 557 972 330 361 86 634 2 574 428 107 143 107 
1904 1 065 571 638 100 380 560 810 316 199 88 182 2 464 428 109 143 109 
1905 1 070 722 654 99 463 569 071 318 628 83 560 2 537 426 118 142 118 
1906 1 077 000 708 105 145 573 059 315 190 83 606 2 535 430 116 143 116 
1907 1 088 673 749 113 288 577 144 315 810 82 431 2 519 433 116 144 116 
1908 1 084 270 770 124 027 583 412 294 056 82 775 2 462 435 119 145 119 
1909 1 102 688 784 130 278 589 821 298 630 83 959 2 472 437 117 146 117 
                                                     
18 The Mun-CG division for 1875 and 1888 has been discussed in the section “Using data on the assisted poor”. 
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1910 1 119 676 866 140 864 591 294 307 841 79 677 2 459 445 127 148 127 
1911 1 122 989 920 153 321 599 031 290 504 80 133 2 462 457 127 152 127 
1912 1 138 014 1 017 237 787 570 380 252 307 77 540 2 292 501 139 167 139 
1913 1 181 740 1 130 256 299 586 611 261 662 77 168 2 486 498 149 166 149 
1914 1 198 991 1 165 277 668 589 343 254 034 77 947 2 491 517 147 172 147 
1915 1 191 118 1 590 315 126 570 701 230 296 74 995 3 241 546 159 182 159 
1916 1 213 725 2 344 403 017 516 477 220 729 73 502 4 842 624 178 208 178 
1917 1 234 220 2 785 414 844 561 408 188 332 69 636 6 040 574 224 224 224 
1918 1 257 369 3 196 448 653 549 757 192 108 66 851 6 001 875 298 298 298 
1919 1 274 625 3 890 556 348 476 176 179 495 62 606 5 959 819 395 395 395 
1920 1 297 828 4 702 512 180 528 326 201 062 56 260 6 439 1 120 494 494 494 
1921 1 320 416 3 512 448 155 521 486 285 654 65 122 5 161 974 507 507 507 
1922 1 341 487 3 170 424 732 542 246 301 006 73 503 4 506 957 492 492 492 
1923 1 359 382 3 140 412 585 561 104 309 925 75 768 4 317 933 469 469 469 
1924 1 366 009 3 468 407 816 580 535 296 892 80 766 4 543 868 462 462 462 
1925 1 382 259 3 491 409 671 581 312 305 945 85 331 4 578 848 480 480 480 
1926 1 401 352 2 869 360 762 618 748 324 945 96 897 4 444 821 482 482 482 
1927 1 416 889 2 587 332 276 644 336 332 594 107 683 4 248 797 485 485 485 
1928 1 429 250 2 583 323 486 661 957 337 679 106 127 4 180 738 492 492 492 
1929 1 455 069 2 656 330 210 668 110 348 444 108 305 4 252 713 451 451 451 
1930 1 462 006 2 701 328 673 680 495 342 738 110 100 4 279 693 434 434 434 
1931 1 484 265 2 331 290 127 704 092 364 673 125 373 4 220 682 371 371 371 
1932 1 500 824 2 324 297 978 700 192 357 232 145 423 3 989 663 359 359 359 
1933 1 520 458 2 323 300 982 706 177 360 450 152 850 3 878 649 352 352 352 
1934 1 543 222 2 450 315 183 704 531 366 504 157 003 3 820 662 347 347 347 
1935 1 565 806 2 627 330 193 712 185 365 219 158 209 3 922 673 354 354 354 
1936 1 583 790 2 919 365 267 723 020 339 260 156 242 4 053 679 371 371 371 
1937 1 610 577 3 372 409 369 717 636 334 786 148 786 4 366 672 378 378 378 
1938 1 632 718 3 497 444 099 700 914 347 219 140 486 4 424 716 387 387 387 
1939 1 654 129 3 755 471 654 712 892 331 743 137 840 4 498 670 406 406 406 
1940 1 674 238 4 019 517 468 730 297 275 149 151 324 4 388 771 377 377 377 
1941 1 688 313 5 134 664 652 653 608 278 337 91 716 4 530 828 523 523 523 
1942 1 695 121 5 137 711 786 637 713 281 683 63 939 4 505 965 576 576 576 
1943 1 704 634 5 223 739 956 618 432 291 888 54 358 4 623 868 555 555 555 
1944 1 716 464 5 198 739 897 612 073 315 106 49 388 4 619 857 613 613 613 
1945 1 730 001 6 330 768 327 596 787 315 131 49 756 4 599 918 576 576 576 
1946 1 746 103 6 303 917 116 442 106 336 076 50 805 4 908 1 041 662 662 662 
1947 1 752 946 7 456 979 409 416 528 308 940 48 069 5 572 1 081 733 733 733 
1948 1 736 464 8 209 1 006 112 401 233 284 421 44 698 6 220 1 114 795 795 795 
1949 1 733 690 8 800 1 076 360 372 694 243 250 41 386 6 266 1 382 835 835 835 
1950 1 727 813 9 463 1 125 158 351 160 212 229 39 266 6 621 1 338 845 845 845 



















1951 1 721 099  11 472  1974 1 989 957  74 603  1996 2 590 583  526 145  
1952 1 723 350  12 556  1975 2 009 594  86 418  1997 2 608 585  558 102  
1953 1 723 163  12 760  1976 2 032 203  98 343  1998 2 629 277  612 113  
1954 1 723 981  14 055  1977 2 052 434  108 545  1999 2 652 168  649 219  
1955 1 725 450  14 826  1978 2 076 830  128 727  2000 2 668 561  697 332 
1957 1 741 998  17 685  1979 2 100 389  137 116  2001 2 683 319  731 486 
1958 1 748 932 17 301 1980 2 126 458  156 663  2002 2 705 535  789 216 
1959 1 758 814  18 382  1981 2 158 775  178 977  2003 2 726 116  828 107 
1960 1 771 109  19 601  1982 2 190 717  201 213  2004 2 752 110  854 319 
1961 1 788 908  21 349  1983 2 222 341  221 096  2005 2 786 213  918 836 
1962 1 809 911  22 996  1984 2 254 414  244 354  2006 2 825 535  909 197 
1963 1 833 869  24 916  1985 2 293 666  268 342  2007 2 879 690  1 007 117 
1964 1 854 113  27 564  1986 2 330 892  303 474  2008 2 933 108 1 109 269 
1965 1 872 800  30 590  1987 2 367 549  343 704  2009 2 979 896 1 124 151 
1966 1 889 704  32 847  1988 2 402 329  370 905  2010 3 035 102 1 171 878 
1967 1 904 805  35 865  1989 2 425 794  387 500  2011 3 079 228 1 244 480 
1968 1 885 438  38 272  1990 2 450 457  408 447  2012 3 135 208 1 329 525 
1969 1 900 571  41 543  1991 2 480 929  428 316  2013 3 187 678 1 399 572 
1970 1 914 912  47 014  1992 2 508 283  449 394  2014 3 239 492 1 463 425 
1971 1 934 029  52 095  1993 2 533 015  466 137  2015 3 281 505 1 553 267 
1972 1 950 723  57 432  1994 2 553 029  475 796  2016 3 321 031 1 562 025 
1973 1 970 938  64 933  1995 2 571 878  500 651  2017 3 358 711 1 616 731 
 
Table A7: Parameters used for calculating four-class Gini. For calculation, see text. Note: 
G**=0.1333 (from z=0.4) for all years. 
 Same for upper and lower bounds Upper bound Lower bound 
Year p n m c a h g g' G* h g g' G* 
1875 0.068 0.099 0.616 0.217 0.010 0.025 0.364 0.338 0.494 0.037 0.371 0.335 0.494 
1888 0.084 0.398 0.446 0.072 0.013 0.076 0.499 0.424 0.461 0.137 0.533 0.395 0.461 
1892 0.084 0.363 0.366 0.188 0.014 0.072 0.324 0.252 0.448 0.078 0.328 0.250 0.448 
1893 0.086 0.360 0.446 0.109 0.013 0.070 0.447 0.377 0.452 0.090 0.459 0.369 0.452 
1894 0.085 0.355 0.490 0.070 0.014 0.071 0.533 0.463 0.447 0.100 0.548 0.448 0.447 
1895 0.081 0.357 0.492 0.070 0.014 0.077 0.538 0.461 0.485 0.101 0.550 0.449 0.485 
1896 0.082 0.346 0.501 0.072 0.013 0.070 0.542 0.472 0.480 0.097 0.555 0.458 0.480 
1897 0.080 0.338 0.506 0.076 0.013 0.068 0.532 0.465 0.488 0.094 0.545 0.452 0.488 
1898 0.079 0.326 0.512 0.083 0.012 0.064 0.517 0.453 0.494 0.087 0.529 0.442 0.494 
1899 0.078 0.328 0.506 0.089 0.012 0.062 0.505 0.443 0.492 0.086 0.518 0.432 0.492 
1900 0.075 0.326 0.509 0.090 0.012 0.067 0.507 0.440 0.495 0.085 0.517 0.432 0.495 
1901 0.078 0.314 0.518 0.090 0.013 0.068 0.517 0.449 0.481 0.085 0.526 0.441 0.481 
1902 0.078 0.308 0.522 0.091 0.014 0.069 0.521 0.453 0.473 0.086 0.530 0.444 0.473 
1903 0.081 0.308 0.521 0.090 0.014 0.069 0.525 0.456 0.469 0.087 0.534 0.447 0.469 
1904 0.083 0.297 0.526 0.094 0.015 0.069 0.527 0.458 0.469 0.086 0.536 0.450 0.456 
1905 0.078 0.298 0.531 0.093 0.015 0.073 0.527 0.455 0.469 0.084 0.533 0.449 0.456 
1906 0.078 0.293 0.532 0.098 0.014 0.065 0.514 0.449 0.456 0.077 0.520 0.443 0.456 
1907 0.076 0.290 0.530 0.104 0.013 0.062 0.500 0.438 0.456 0.074 0.506 0.432 0.353 
1908 0.076 0.271 0.538 0.114 0.013 0.058 0.486 0.428 0.456 0.068 0.491 0.423 0.353 
1909 0.076 0.271 0.535 0.118 0.013 0.057 0.476 0.419 0.456 0.068 0.482 0.414 0.353 
1910 0.071 0.275 0.528 0.126 0.012 0.057 0.464 0.407 0.456 0.064 0.468 0.404 0.353 
1911 0.071 0.259 0.533 0.137 0.011 0.051 0.450 0.399 0.456 0.059 0.455 0.395 0.353 
1912 0.068 0.222 0.501 0.209 0.011 0.045 0.374 0.328 0.456 0.052 0.378 0.326 0.353 
1913 0.065 0.221 0.496 0.217 0.010 0.045 0.345 0.300 0.353 0.049 0.348 0.299 0.353 
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1914 0.065 0.212 0.492 0.232 0.010 0.042 0.335 0.293 0.353 0.047 0.338 0.291 0.284 
1915 0.063 0.193 0.479 0.265 0.008 0.031 0.257 0.226 0.353 0.034 0.260 0.226 0.284 
1916 0.061 0.182 0.426 0.332 0.006 0.022 0.161 0.138 0.353 0.025 0.163 0.138 0.284 
1917 0.056 0.153 0.455 0.336 0.006 0.021 0.132 0.112 0.353 0.021 0.132 0.112 0.284 
1918 0.053 0.153 0.437 0.357 0.006 0.024 0.172 0.148 0.353 0.024 0.172 0.148 0.284 
1919 0.049 0.141 0.374 0.436 0.006 0.025 0.127 0.103 0.353 0.025 0.127 0.103 0.284 
1920 0.043 0.155 0.407 0.395 0.006 0.027 0.175 0.148 0.353 0.027 0.175 0.148 0.284 
1921 0.049 0.216 0.395 0.339 0.009 0.051 0.222 0.171 0.353 0.051 0.222 0.171 0.284 
1922 0.055 0.224 0.404 0.317 0.011 0.058 0.259 0.201 0.353 0.058 0.259 0.201 0.284 
1923 0.056 0.228 0.413 0.304 0.011 0.058 0.272 0.214 0.353 0.058 0.272 0.214 0.284 
1924 0.059 0.217 0.425 0.299 0.011 0.050 0.253 0.203 0.353 0.050 0.253 0.203 0.284 
1925 0.062 0.221 0.421 0.296 0.012 0.054 0.251 0.197 0.353 0.054 0.251 0.197 0.284 
1926 0.069 0.232 0.442 0.257 0.016 0.071 0.294 0.224 0.353 0.071 0.294 0.224 0.284 
1927 0.076 0.235 0.455 0.235 0.020 0.083 0.327 0.245 0.353 0.083 0.327 0.245 0.284 
1928 0.074 0.236 0.463 0.226 0.020 0.084 0.327 0.243 0.353 0.084 0.327 0.243 0.284 
1929 0.074 0.239 0.459 0.227 0.018 0.078 0.311 0.234 0.353 0.078 0.311 0.234 0.284 
1930 0.075 0.234 0.465 0.225 0.018 0.073 0.306 0.233 0.353 0.073 0.306 0.233 0.284 
1931 0.084 0.246 0.474 0.195 0.020 0.078 0.338 0.260 0.353 0.078 0.338 0.260 0.284 
1932 0.097 0.238 0.467 0.199 0.022 0.078 0.337 0.259 0.353 0.078 0.337 0.259 0.284 
1933 0.101 0.237 0.464 0.198 0.023 0.078 0.338 0.260 0.353 0.078 0.338 0.260 0.284 
1934 0.102 0.237 0.457 0.204 0.022 0.074 0.333 0.258 0.353 0.074 0.333 0.258 0.284 
1935 0.101 0.233 0.455 0.211 0.021 0.071 0.322 0.251 0.353 0.071 0.322 0.251 0.284 
1936 0.099 0.214 0.457 0.231 0.020 0.063 0.296 0.233 0.353 0.063 0.296 0.233 0.284 
1937 0.092 0.208 0.446 0.254 0.017 0.054 0.255 0.201 0.353 0.054 0.255 0.201 0.284 
1938 0.086 0.213 0.429 0.272 0.016 0.054 0.246 0.192 0.284 0.054 0.246 0.192 0.284 
1939 0.083 0.201 0.431 0.285 0.015 0.051 0.225 0.174 0.315 0.051 0.225 0.174 0.284 
1940 0.090 0.164 0.436 0.309 0.014 0.040 0.231 0.191 0.315 0.040 0.231 0.191 0.284 
1941 0.054 0.165 0.387 0.394 0.009 0.038 0.184 0.147 0.315 0.038 0.184 0.147 0.284 
1942 0.038 0.166 0.376 0.420 0.007 0.039 0.193 0.155 0.315 0.039 0.193 0.155 0.284 
1943 0.032 0.171 0.363 0.434 0.006 0.037 0.167 0.131 0.315 0.037 0.167 0.131 0.284 
1944 0.029 0.184 0.357 0.431 0.006 0.043 0.170 0.127 0.315 0.043 0.170 0.127 0.284 
1945 0.029 0.182 0.345 0.444 0.005 0.033 0.163 0.130 0.315 0.033 0.163 0.130 0.284 
1946 0.029 0.192 0.253 0.525 0.005 0.041 0.130 0.089 0.315 0.041 0.130 0.089 0.284 
1947 0.027 0.176 0.238 0.559 0.005 0.035 0.109 0.074 0.315 0.035 0.109 0.074 0.284 
1948 0.026 0.164 0.231 0.579 0.004 0.032 0.096 0.065 0.315 0.032 0.096 0.065 0.315 
1949 0.024 0.140 0.215 0.621 0.004 0.027 0.096 0.069 0.315 0.027 0.096 0.069 0.315 
1950 0.023 0.123 0.203 0.651 0.004 0.022 0.080 0.058 0.318 0.022 0.080 0.058 0.318 





Table A8. Mean of the upper and lower bounds of the Gini coefficient, the upper tail (above 
median) Gini coefficient, the ratio between the lower tail (above the median) and upper tail 










1C   2C     3C   
1875 .548 .508 .219 .492 .634 .548 .501 
1888 .605 .489 .132 .544 .685 .605 .553 
1892 .640 .515 .110 .577 .718 .640 .584 
1893 .619 .491 .123 .552 .702 .619 .563 
1894 .593 .461 .138 .522 .681 .593 .536 
1895 .588 .462 .145 .518 .673 .588 .532 
1896 .584 .454 .147 .512 .673 .584 .527 
1897 .585 .460 .149 .513 .674 .585 .528 
1898 .588 .467 .151 .516 .678 .588 .531 
1899 .591 .469 .148 .519 .681 .591 .534 
1900 .586 .469 .154 .515 .674 .586 .530 
1901 .574 .459 .163 .503 .664 .574 .518 
1902 .568 .454 .168 .496 .658 .568 .512 
1903 .567 .451 .168 .495 .657 .567 .510 
1904 .559 .444 .176 .486 .650 .559 .501 
1905 .558 .450 .179 .486 .646 .558 .502 
1906 .566 .453 .173 .493 .657 .566 .509 
1907 .569 .452 .169 .495 .662 .569 .510 
1908 .565 .454 .175 .492 .659 .565 .507 
1909 .569 .458 .173 .495 .662 .569 .510 
1910 .572 .461 .170 .499 .666 .572 .513 
1911 .572 .461 .173 .497 .667 .572 .512 
1912 .561 .455 .182 .487 .658 .561 .500 
1913 .570 .457 .171 .496 .667 .570 .507 
1914 .559 .438 .174 .483 .661 .559 .494 
1915 .597 .465 .142 .522 .698 .597 .530 
1916 .626 .458 .104 .547 .731 .626 .553 
1917 .645 .476 .089 .570 .745 .645 .573 
1918 .594 .430 .124 .514 .700 .594 .522 
1919 .573 .372 .116 .486 .685 .573 .498 
1920 .560 .391 .143 .478 .670 .560 .489 
1921 .558 .418 .157 .484 .654 .558 .492 
1922 .543 .414 .174 .470 .637 .543 .479 
1923 .544 .417 .174 .471 .639 .544 .480 
1924 .565 .435 .159 .492 .661 .565 .500 
1925 .568 .441 .157 .497 .661 .568 .504 
1926 .555 .456 .176 .492 .637 .555 .497 
1927 .542 .459 .191 .483 .617 .542 .488 
1928 .546 .471 .191 .490 .618 .546 .494 
1929 .564 .480 .176 .506 .639 .564 .509 
1930 .572 .486 .170 .513 .648 .572 .517 
1931 .573 .492 .172 .515 .648 .573 .520 
1932 .573 .488 .171 .514 .650 .573 .519 
1933 .574 .487 .170 .514 .651 .574 .519 
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1934 .576 .480 .165 .514 .656 .576 .519 
1935 .580 .481 .161 .517 .662 .580 .523 
1936 .583 .480 .157 .519 .667 .583 .524 
1937 .599 .485 .142 .533 .685 .599 .538 
1938 .585 .454 .143 .515 .677 .585 .520 
1939 .594 .464 .137 .525 .683 .594 .529 
1940 .574 .430 .147 .498 .675 .574 .505 
1941 .543 .375 .152 .462 .650 .543 .472 
1942 .513 .348 .177 .431 .621 .513 .443 
1943 .526 .346 .157 .442 .635 .526 .455 
1944 .524 .349 .160 .442 .628 .524 .454 
1945 .526 .337 .156 .438 .641 .526 .452 
1946 .494 .300 .180 .401 .611 .494 .421 
1947 .491 .300 .191 .394 .611 .491 .416 
1948 .496 .315 .195 .400 .616 .496 .422 
1949 .468 .315 .238 .375 .590 .468 .397 
1950 .464 .318 .247 .372 .589 .464 .394 
1951 .446 .284 .252 .350 .577 .446 .373 
1952 .430 .233 .238 .331 .560 .430 .353 
1953 .420 .221 .244 .321 .550 .420 .343 
1954 .421 .224 .243 .324 .548 .421 .345 
1955 .423 .230 .245 .325 .552 .423 .347 
1957 .437 .245 .236 .339 .565 .437 .360 
1958 .437 .238 .232 .336 .568 .437 .359 
1959 .434 .233 .232 .334 .564 .434 .356 
1960 .427 .226 .239 .326 .556 .427 .349 
1961 .432 .227 .235 .329 .565 .431 .352 
1962 .432 .221 .232 .327 .569 .432 .351 
1963 .436 .223 .227 .331 .571 .436 .354 
1964 .426 .216 .238 .322 .562 .426 .346 
1965 .428 .213 .233 .323 .562 .428 .347 
1966 .425 .212 .235 .321 .559 .425 .345 
1967 .441 .227 .219 .338 .572 .441 .360 
1968 .435 .226 .227 .333 .567 .435 .355 
1969 .431 .227 .234 .330 .561 .431 .352 
1970 .430 .228 .235 .329 .560 .430 .351 
1971 .427 .224 .238 .326 .557 .427 .349 
1972 .425 .223 .239 .324 .556 .425 .347 
1973 .426 .223 .239 .325 .557 .426 .347 
1974 .425 .220 .239 .323 .556 .425 .345 
1975 .429 .217 .232 .325 .561 .429 .348 
1976 .422 .211 .239 .318 .556 .422 .342 
1977 .414 .209 .250 .311 .548 .415 .335 
1978 .408 .209 .258 .307 .540 .408 .330 
1979 .404 .207 .264 .303 .535 .404 .326 
1980 .396 .203 .273 .296 .527 .396 .319 
1981 .396 .205 .274 .297 .526 .396 .319 
1982 .397 .208 .273 .299 .525 .397 .321 
1983 .400 .212 .269 .303 .527 .400 .325 
1984 .403 .216 .267 .306 .529 .403 .328 
1985 .404 .220 .268 .308 .530 .404 .329 
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1986 .405 .224 .268 .310 .530 .405 .330 
1987 .409 .227 .266 .313 .535 .409 .334 
1988 .407 .229 .268 .313 .533 .407 .333 
1989 .401 .232 .277 .310 .523 .401 .329 
1990 .406 .235 .272 .314 .528 .406 .333 
1991 .411 .242 .266 .321 .531 .411 .339 
1992 .426 .271 .257 .341 .539 .426 .357 
1993 .440 .290 .248 .356 .551 .440 .372 
1994 .443 .294 .245 .359 .556 .444 .375 
1995 .442 .293 .248 .357 .556 .442 .373 
1996 .444 .297 .248 .360 .557 .444 .376 
1997 .447 .303 .247 .364 .561 .447 .380 
1998 .436 .296 .258 .353 .548 .436 .369 
1999 .437 .301 .258 .356 .548 .438 .372 
2000 .456 .325 .246 .376 .564 .456 .391 
2001 .435 .296 .259 .353 .547 .435 .369 
2002 .453 .323 .248 .373 .561 .453 .389 
2003 .461 .334 .243 .382 .566 .461 .397 
2004 .469 .343 .237 .391 .574 .469 .406 
2005 .506 .397 .214 .433 .603 .506 .447 
2006 .447 .308 .248 .366 .555 .447 .381 
2007 .457 .322 .241 .377 .564 .457 .392 
2008 .449 .317 .248 .370 .554 .449 .385 
2009 .447 .312 .247 .369 .550 .447 .383 
2010 .451 .319 .244 .374 .552 .451 .388 
2011 .448 .317 .249 .370 .550 .448 .384 
2012 .448 .317 .247 .371 .550 .448 .385 
2013 .451 .320 .246 .373 .552 .451 .387 
2014 .454 .325 .243 .378 .555 .454 .391 
2015 .470 .349 .234 .395 .568 .470 .408 
2016 .464 .340 .237 .389 .562 .464 .402 




Figure A8. Mean income below the median relative to mean income above the median
Note: The components are estimated using the same distribution as the one used for obtaining Gini coefficients 
in Figure 3. The calculation is based on the mean of upper and lower bound estimates. For sources, methods and 





Appendix G: Income shares of income groups and decomposition 
of the top 10 per cent 
Income shares 
Figure A9 shows the development of cumulative income shares between 1875 and 2017, based on the 
average of the upper and lower bound income distributions. The interval between the topmost line at 
100 per cent and the next line at 99 per cent shows the share of the top 1 per cent. We observe that this 
decreases from more than 20 per cent at the beginning of the period to around 10 per cent at the end. 
The second interval shows the income share of the 90-99 per cent, the next the share of the 80-90 per 
cent, and so on. The income share of the lowest 10 per cent is largely based on data on recipients of 
poverty support, and ranges between just less than 1 per cent in the year with the lowest share to 
around 2.7 per cent in the year with the highest share. A detailed table of estimated income shares is 
available as an online appendix.  
 
Figure A9. Top 1 and decile-specific shares of income in Norway, 1875-2017 
 
Note: Each line in Figure A3 (labelled with the a number i shows the cumulative share of income of the lowest i 
per cent of the population, e.g. the gap between the line labelled 99 and the line labelled 100 is the top 1% 
income share, the gap between 90 and 99 is the 90-99% income share, the distance between 80 and 90 is the 80-
90% income share, and so on. The components are estimated using the same distribution as the one used for 
obtaining Gini coefficients in Figure 3. The graphs display the mean of the upper and lower bound estimates. For 




Figure A10 shows the development of the top 1 per cent income share together with the development 
of the income share of the top 90-99 per cent (e.g. the next 9 per cent) for our lower and upper bound 
assumptions. We observe that the assumptions matter slightly for the calculation of upper and lower 
bounds in the prewar period, due to the different Pareto distributions used for imputation of the top of 
the income distribution in years for which detailed data is not available. The income share of the top 
90-99 per cent is shown to be high and moderately increasing until around 1940, to decrease over a 
10-year period. In the postwar period, this share is low and stable but it increases slightly from 1980 
onward. 
 
Figure A10. Top 1 and 90-99 per cent income shares 
 
Note: The components are estimated using the same distribution as the one used for obtaining Gini coefficients 
in Figure 3. For sources, methods and assumptions, see text. 
 
Figure A11 shows the development of the income shares of the top 10 per cent, top 50-90 per cent and 
the bottom 90 per cent over time. 
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Figure A11. Top 10, 50-90 and 0-50 per cent income shares 
Note: The components are estimated using the same distribution as the one used for obtaining Gini coefficients 
in Figure 3. For sources, methods and assumptions, see text. 
Decomposition of the overall Gini coefficient with respect to the income share of 
the top 10 per cent and the Gini coefficient of the remaing 90 per cent 
In this appendix section, we examine how the results in Section 4.1 on the relationship between the top 
1 per cent income share and the Gini coefficient correspons to the relationship  between the top 10 per 
cent income share and the Gini coefficient. 
 
To this end, we rely on the decomposition  
 
𝐺 = 𝑥 ∙ 𝑆 ∙ 𝐺𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑥% + (1 − 𝑆) ∙ 𝐺𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 (100−𝑥)% − 0.01 ∙ (1 − 𝑆) ∙ 𝐺𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 (100−𝑥)% + 𝑆 − 𝑥/100  
which can, for low x, be simplified to 
 




Figure A12. Decomposition of Gini coefficient into top 1 per cent income share and Gini 
coefficient components 
 
Note: The components are estimated using the same distribution as the one used for obtaining Gini coefficients 
in Figure 3. The graphs display the mean of the upper and lower bound estimates. For sources, methods and 
assumptions, see text. 
 
Figure A12 for x=1 includes the graphs provided by Figure 5, but does also include the evolution of 
the Gini of the bottom 99 per cent (the dashed line). While there are similarities between the 
development of the top 1per cent income share and the Gini coefficient for the 99 per cent times the 
income share of the 99 per cent, there are also important differences, notably for the changes during 
the mid-twentieth century. 
 
We now turn to a similar decomposition for the top 10 per cent. In this case, the approximation proves 
to be less precise. Most importantly, the last term (x) of the decomposition is 0.10 whereas it was 0.01 
as for the 1 per cent decomposition case, which means that the remaining components no longer add 
up to the overall Gini coefficient. This makes the interpretation of changes more demanding as we 
omit a term that is constant across time with terms that vary across time. Moreover, the two remaining 
terms that are omitted in the approximation show to vary somewhat over time, but these terms are 
small compared to the two terms that defines the approximation of the Gini coefficient. 
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Note: The components are estimated using the same distribution as the one used for obtaining Gini coefficients 
in Figure 3. The graphs display the mean of the upper and lower bound estimates. For sources, methods and 
assumptions, see text. 
 
Figures A12 and A13 demonstrate that the decompositions for x=1 and x=10 roughly spoken provide 
congruent pictures of the evolution of top income shares and the associated Gini coeffcients. However, 
during the mid-twentieth century the top 10 per cent income share shows to decrease more sharply 
than the top 1 per cent. Moreover, the decrease of the Gini of the bottom 90 per cent times the income 
share of the bottom 90 per cent shows to be less systematic than the decrease of of the Gini of the 
bottom 99 per cent times the income share of the bottom 99 per cent.  
 
 
